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This thesis examines the force procurement element of the
military strategic planning process and is comprised of two
parts. First, models are constructed to depict ideal strategic
planning. The initial step in each model is the formulation of
the national interest. The national interest is defined in
terms useful to strategic planners by creating a unique
paradigm based on the Constitution. The technological
imperative hypothesis is explored as an aberration to the ideal
strategic planning process. Second, the technological
imperative hypothesis is tested with case studies of the
Polaris and the Tomahawk. Even though the hypothesis was
disproved in each case, the case studies yielded useful
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I. INTRODUCTION
"The most striking and far-reaching trend within the
naval profession in recent years has been the
emphasis on strategy as the focus of naval thought,
planning, resource allocation, and employment."
-James Watkins, ADM, USN (ret), 1986, p. 15
Admiral Watkins' statement described the expanding
interest in strategic planning in the 1980s. This resurgence
in ^categic thinking has led to two unprecedented public
policy papers detailing US defense policy: The Maritime
Strategy (Watkins, 1986) and National Security Strategy of
the United States (The White House, 1987). Both papers
addressed the strategic planning process: formulating the
national interest, which yields the nation's military
strategy, and thus provides the framework for force
procurement and war plans.
Strategic planning is the process that links together the
three essential building-block elements of defense planning:
interests, strategy, and capabilities. This process may be
shown in diagrammatic form as:
national military military
interest " strategy capabilities
Of course, this flow path represents the ideal sequence of
events. It is axiomatic that multitudes of actors
participate in the defense planning process, such as Congress
and the bureaucracies. Many of these players have their own
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agendas, explicit or hidden, or, at the least, widely
diverging viewpoints. In particular, the Net Assessment
Office under the Secretary of Defense plays a significant
role in the strategic planning process by evaluating US
program plans with respect to the Soviet threat.
Debate on these components focuses on how well matched
they are with respect to each other. Recently, for instance,
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has concerned himself
with the strategy-capabilities issue (Weinberger, 1987, p.
5). At other times in the nuclear age, people have argued
the interests-strategy issue, such as whether or not the
concept of Assured Destruction was in the national interest
(Haley, et al , 1985, p. 93).
The present study will look at both of these facets of
strategic planning. First, the concept of national interest
will be examined. Should the concept represent the enduring,
lofty values of the United States or should it express the
platform of a transient elected political leadership? An
attempt will be made to define the national interest in terms
useful for strategic planning.
Second, it has been hypothesized that another input into
weapons procurement is the so-called technological
imperative, whereby the technological momentum created by
industry and the research and development (R and D)
establishments tends to promote weapons procurement not in
accordance with established strategy. The technological
imperative critique of US defense planning shifted into full
swing during the MIRV and ABM debates of the 1967-1972
period. This paper attempts to explore the technological
imperative input into the strategic planning process by
examining the decision to procure the Polaris Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and Tomahawk Submarine
Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) systems through two case
studies
.
Enunciation of the national interest lies at the level of
the highest elected officals of the nation. It is an area
where strategic studies scholars tread uncertainly.
International relations specialists have largely neglected
this area of research since the mid-1960s. Donald
Nuechterlein is one of the few contemporary scholars who
writes significantly on the national interest, but even his
work concentrates mostly on foreign policy, not defense
studies. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, in his 1963
Farewell Address at West Point, advised against those in the
profession of arms getting involved in national problems at
this high level (MacArthur, 1963). Nevertheless, exploration
of this academic area should yield fruitful results and lay
the groundwork for probing the strategy-capabilities issue.
The literature on the technological imperative is more
rich than that on the national interest. However, nothing
was found that analyzed if strategy (in the ideal process) or
technology (in the non-ideal process) drove the Polaris Fleet
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Ballistic Missile (FBM) program. Michael Armacost (1969),
Edmund Beard (1976), Ted Greenwood (1975), and Harvey
Sapolsky (1972) have all written well-known case studies of
the Polaris and Air Force ICBM programs, but they dealt
almost exclusively with the bureaucratic/organizational
perspective made famous by Graham Allison (1971) and Morton
Halperin (1974).
Since the cruise missile spawned so many variants, both
Navy and Air Force, a much more extensive set of studies has
been written. Richard Betts (1982), Ronald Huisken (1981),
Charles Sorrels (1983), and Kenneth Werrell (1985) have
written significant works on the cruise missile. Art and
Ockenden (1981), Canfield and Kellet (1978), Gerard Farrell
(1981), David Hobbs (1982) and Pfaltzgraff and Davis (1977)
have written incisive, but shorter studies. Many of the
studies specifically addressed the technological imperative.
This study tests the hypothesis that the technological
imperative played a role in the procurement of the Polaris
and Tomahawk weapons systems. In each study, the hypothesis
was disproved. The study finds that the development and
procurement decisions for each weapon were preceded by
forceful statements of strategic aims. Moreover, the
national interest, as defined in this study, properly
supported the strategies which drove the Polaris and Tomahawk
decisions. In summary, strategy drove technology in the
11
Polaris and Tomahawk case studies; technology did not drive
strategy, as the technological imperative hypothesis calls
for .
12
II. STRATEGIC PLANNING: A MODEL OF
ENDS-WAYS-MEANS
A. THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS
Alice: "Would you tell me, please, which way I
ought to walk from here?"
Cheshire Cat: "That depends a good deal on where you
want to get to.
"
Alice: "I don't care much where—
"
Cheshire Cat: "Then it doesn't matter which way you
walk."
-Lewis Carroll, pp. 78-79
1. Introduction
Before an operational definition of strategic
planning can be arrived at, one must first understand the
larger intellectual and practical environment from which it
comes: national security affairs. In its broadest sense,
national security is the protection of internal values from
external threat in a mode consistent with democracy. This
academic field evolved out of World War II and the National
Security Act of 1947, which created the National Security
Council and a multidisciplinary approach to defense.
National security affairs, therefore, might be seen as a
child of the post-war nuclear era, when national survival
depended on integrating all facets of national power --
military, economic, and political.
Since this study will focus on strategy, several
definitions are appropriate so as not to confuse strategy
with doctrine. John Collins (1982) provided a succinct
13
definition of military strategy: "The art and science of
employing military power ... to attain natior[al] security
objectives." (pp. 303-313) Tactics are "the employment of
units in combat." (JCS, 1986, p. 359) Tactics essentially
implement strategy. Doctrine, on the other hand, implements
both strategy and tactics. I.B. Holley, Jr. (1986) defined
military doctrine as based on experience and employing
inductive inference: "that mode of approach which repeated
experience has shown usually works best." (emphasis in
original) (p. 2) Doctrine tends to be task- or service-
specific, such as, infantry or amphibious doctrine (Matthews,
1987) .
2 . Functional Description
Strategic planning is the process of developing broad
conceptual plans and strategies in support of national policy
and allocating resources to achieve those objectives (DON,
1974). Carl Builder (1987) provided an equally valid
definition: "the formulation and application of strategy for
the planning of future forces." (p. v) In either case,
strategic planning is the very essence of the executive
function. There is widespread agreement as to the place of
planning in the overall administrative process. Steiner
(1979) stated that a large bureaucracy has two types of
management: "strategic management" at the top of the
organization, and "operational management" for the rest of
14
the organization. Furthermore, strategic planning was the
function which supported strategic management, (p. 4)
Strategic planning can be broken down according to
the following functions:
1. War plans: including plans for war termination and
contingency plans for limited conflicts
2. Programming: how much and what kind of weapons and
forces to procure. (Tritten, 1987)
The public only sees the force procurement function on a
daily basis. To a lesser extent, contingency plans have
become publicly debated, especially in light of the Persian
Gulf tension.
3 . Relationship of Interest, Strategy, and
Capabilities
The strategic planning functions are applied in the
context of the interest, strategy, capabilities discussed
earlier; this shorthand notation is reproduced as Figure 1.
Interest > Strategy > Capabilities
Fig. 1 Military Strategic Planning
Model
Interests describe the common purposes of the United States,
i.e., its national goals and overseas committments. These
are the ends toward which policy is created. Strategy in
No textbooks exist on military strategic planning.
Also, the Library of Congress subject catalog cross-
references only business topics under the strategic planning
heading.
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this context represents military strategy, "the manner in
which military power should be developed and applied to
achieve national objectives...." (JCS, 1986, p. 228)
Capabilities represent the weapons systems and force levels
needed to support military strategy. The arrows indicate the
direction in which these elements influence or should
influence each other.
Not surprisingly, Figure 1 is exactly parallel to the
business paradigm of strategic planning. Robert Hayes (1985)
discussed the traditional model (Figure 2) and offered two
arguments to justify its sequence.
Ends > Ways » Means
Fig. 2 Business Strategic Planning
Model
First, managers (strategic planners in the military) must
know the organization's objectives before they can generate
programs to achieve them. Hayes used the Lewis Carroll quote
printed above to illustrate this point. Second, the desire
to maximize efficient use of resources drives the
conventional sequence, (p. 112)
The concrete link between these three components of
national security is the budget. However the budget also
provides the major constraint. In reality, the nation's
limited resources may impose a budgetary ceiling which
affects strategy and forces the refinement or cancellation of
national security interests. Olvey (1984) called this the
16
domestic policy approach to decision-making; furthermore,
resource constraints may ultimately affect even national
values, (p. 47)
Figure 1 is a useful tool in understanding the
national security strategy of the United States. As with any
conceptual model, it can be modified to illustrate certain
relationships. The Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to
the Congress Fiscal Year 1988 ( DOD , 1987, p. 15), for
example, added the net assessment function, as shown in
Figure 3:
Interest-—>Threat > Strategy ^Capabilities
Fig. 3 Threat-based Strategic
Planning Model
4 . Decision-making Models
Military strategy is a broad term; presently it
describes the US strategy of deterrence through credible
response. Four separate services make up this military
strategy. Figure 4 suggests a way to view the contribution
















Fig. 4 Service-based Decision-making
Model
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A major defect in Figure 1 was that almost every military
capability could have evolved from the military strategy of
deterrence. Figure 4 shows that individual services should
have a strategy to determine their force procurement. This
model suffers from several flaws: first, does or should each
service have its own strategy, or should it correctly be
called doctrine? Second, in today's environment of joint
arms warfare, no one service is likely to perform according
to its own strategy or doctrine. Instead, for example, the
Army and Air Force will fight together in Europe. Indeed,
one could argue that in the nuclear age, individual services
exist only to provide an administrative function of
providing, maintaining, and training the forces.
This discussion ends with a final iteration of the
interest-strategy-capability model. Figure 5 corrects Figure
4
's two shortcomings by employing unified and specified




I I I I I I
CINCSAC CINCPAC CINCLANT CINCEUR CINCSOUTH CINCRED
Strategy Strategy Strategy Strategy Strategy Strategy
Capab. Capab. Capab. Capab . Capab . Capab.
Fig. 5 Operational Commander-based
Decision-making Model
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The Strategic Air Command (SAC) is a specified
command with distinct hardware requirements that lends itself
well to this model. The unified commands, while not having
the distinct capabilities requirements as a specified
command, each have their own strategy. Strategy also is the
correct concept, compared to doctrine which implies single
service (Collins, 1982, p. 308). Furthermore, the
Commanders-in-Chief (CINC) of these commands have lately been




These models serve to round out this brief discussion
on strategic planning. One common thread linked each model:
The primacy of national security interests; it underlies the
entire process of strategic planning. The business community
certainly comprehends the significance of articulating the
mission of an organization. Peter Drucker wrote that the
primary task of an organization's senior leaders is to ask
and answer the question. "What is our business and what
should it be?" (Steiner, 1979, p. 6) Indeed, a major theme in
Hitch and McKean's (1960) landmark book, The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age , was to ask the right question (p.
48) .
The next section of this paper seeks to answer this
question for the United States in terms useful to a strategic
planner. Even if no such answer can be arrived at, the
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derivation and exposition of the national security interest
should be beneficial to those charged with protecting and
enhancing it. The strategic planner should understand that
his specialty provides the link "between the hardware and
tactics of our forces, military and diplomatic, to the core
values of our nation...." (Roncolato, 1983, p. 33)
B. THE ENDS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING: THE NATIONAL INTEREST
"We do not scrap the Constitution because learned judges
cannot agree on the interpretation of its provisions. All
profound moral doctrine is broad enough so that its
particular application generates controversy as is manifest
in the old saying about the devil's ability to quote
Scripture to his own purpose."
-T. Taylor, 1970, p. 16
1 . Introduction
As an academic concept, the national interest does
not have the enduring nobility of the Constitution; it has
almost been scrapped. Yet it lives on in political speeches
and government documents. People invoke it to justify the
nation's action, but few actually know what it means.
The last section showed that national interest is at
the apex of a pyramid from which strategy and capabilities
flow. This section will explore in detail its meaning. In
the first part, national interest will be differentiated from
its sister term public interest. Next, a review of the
international relations and strategic studies literature will
be conducted. Third, the complex, often philosophical
process of formulating the national interest will be treated.
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Finally, the national interest will be addressed in the
context of the Constitution. It will be argued that the
concept of national interest should not have been scrapped,
but rather treated like that other famous "idea" with varying
interpretations: the Constitution.
2. The National Interest v. Public Interest
By convention, in the field of political science,
national and public interest define two different ideas. A
contemporary scholar (Donald Nuechterlein, 1978 and 1979) has
defined the national interest as "the aspirations and goals
of sovereign entities in the international arena." (1978, p.
1 ) The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
defined public interest as "a continuum that represents the
values, aspirations, and objectives of the community of
polity." (Sills, 1968, vol 13, p. 171) Therefore, in common
usuage, national interest applies to foreign policy goals and
public interest applies to domestic policy goals. Johansen
(1980) defined an interest wider in scope than national and
public interest combined: the human interest. This concept
incorporates all the world's aspirations and is supported by
the Globalists school of international relations.
The state's coercive power backs up each set of
interests. The armed forces and economic sanctions enforce
or defend national interest. The regulatory agencies
(through the criminal justice system), the civil justice
system, fiscal, and monetary policies support the public
21
interest. Additionally, common usuage ascribes police/fire
protection, sewer/water districts, and parks/recreation
departments to the public interest.
National and public interest are normally treated as
discrete topics with no concept relating them. Barry (1962),
however, introduced the phrase "common interest" to describe
all the interests shared in a nation (p. 197). Weinberger
used the phrase "national security interest" to define goals
typically assigned to "national interest" (1987, p. 9). The
White House publication The National Security Strategy of th^
United States of America chose the more traditional term
"national interest" in its discussion of goals and purposes
(White House, 1987). Nevertheless, national security affairs
is an interdisciplinary field, and should include both
national interest and public interest.
The two expressions of a state's aspirations have not
enjoyed equal success in the literature. The Library of
Congress subject headings have no listing for national
interest. On the other hand, it has a full listing for
public interest, including cross-references to public
interest law, class action suits, and whistle-blowing.
(Library of Congress, pp. 2171, 2601)
3. Explanation of the National Interest
The review of the literature on national interest
will focus on two viewpoints. The first is from the
international relation community. These scholars originated
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study into this field to answer a persistent question among
students of foreign policy: What makes sovereign nations
behave as they do? The other view point is from the area of
strategic studies. This is an interdisciplinary group
consisting of military historians, traditional strategists,
and nuclear strategists.
a. International Relations
Sondermann (1977) wrote that the attempt to
distinguish between different tribes or city-states began
during the days of Greek civilization. Early forms of the
concept of national interest evolved from the phrase raison
d "etat , meaning reason of state, and advanced into the theme
of national honor.
National interest gained its widest use from the
Realist school of international relations led by Hans
Morgenthau following WW II. This school believed that
nations should act on the basis of furthering their own
power. It eschewed moral principles, e.g. those espoused by
Woodrow Wilson, as an impetus for a state's foreign policy.
Morgenthau wrote:
"The illusion that a nation can escape, if it wants to,
from power politics into a realm where action is guided by
moral principles rather than by consideration of power is
deeply rooted in the American mind." (1951, p. 10)
Morgenthau 's equating of national interest with
protection and enhancement of a state's power came under
attack. He answered the critics charges that his version was
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too vague and open to interpretation by comparing it to the
"general welfare" of the Constitution. That is to say, the
term has its own innate meaning but its content varies with
political tradition. He summarized this by writing that the
national interest had two elements, a permanent, logical
element and a variable element. (Morgenthau, 1952, pp. 971-
972)
Another Realist, Robert Osgood (1953),
contributed a more specific set of motives for US foreign
policy (in order of decreasing priority):
1. survival: territorial integrity and
government institutions




5. national aggrandizement. (Osgood, pp. 5-6)
Osgood substituted the term "national self-interest" for
national interest and defined it as "a state of affairs
valued solely for its benefit to the nation." This contrasted
with his definition of ideals: "state of affairs worthy of
acheivement by virtue of its universal moral values." (p. 4)
Morgenthau and Osgood both treated the role of
morality in formulating the national interest defensively.
Robinson (1969) succinctly summarized Morgenthau:
"Thinking in terms of the national interest is morally
necessary, for the state... has no moral right to risk
sacrifice of the nation for the sake of certain moral
principles. Instead, its highest moral principle must be
survival, for the state is entrusted with the very lives of
its citizens...." (Robinson, p. 186)
24
Osgood considers ideals and national self interest as not
mutually exclusive. His ideals are based on John Locke's
natural rights philosophy and contrasts this sharply with the
Idealists' call for "peace, goodwill and justice" which would
require national self sacrifice, in contradiction of natural
rights
.
In the 1960 's the Behavioralist school attacked
the concept of national interest on the grounds that it was
not objective. This school attempted to study foreign policy
on the basis of empirical methods. Rosenau (1969) reduced
the argument over national interest to "objective" versus
"subjective." He considered this debate essentially
unresolvable since it rested on plilosophical issues that
"each researcher must resolve for himself." (p. 168) Rosenau
criticized the Realist school because it seemed to require an
objective truth. Rosenau felt that the national interest was
"a pluralistic set of subjective preferences that change
whenever the requirements and aspirations of the nation's
members change." (1971, p. 242)
Kaplan (1969) delved into the debate with his
version of objective and subjective national interest. He
stated that "the interest of a nation is to satisfy national
needs." (p. 168) Seabury (1973) used a somewhat circular
argument; he called the national interest a "frame of
reference" for reviewing a foreign policy whose goal was to
protect the state's "interests, the welfare, and the secure
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survival of its land and people." (p. 22) Holsti (1983) has
writ:en a current textbook on international relations which
noted that a long debate has existed on the meaning cf
national interest. He concluded that the term is too vague
for use in assessing foreign policy and redefined it as "the
objectives" of a nation. (p. 123)
Nuechterlein is one of the few contemporary
international relations scholars to have devoted most of his
professional energy to the study of the national interest.
His matrix for the evaluation of the national interest in a
given crisis situation has provided the foundation for
numerous books and articles.
National Interests and Presidential Leadership
(Nuechterlein, 1978) was an attempt to resurrect the concept
of national interest from the academic depths of the 1960s
and 1970s. He credited the Vietnam experience with awakening
the need in foreign policy scholars to find improved methods
of determining US goals. Nuechterlein distinguished three
important reasons for the weakness of national interest as an
academic field. First, the current emphasis on
interdependence theory in foreign relations has shifted the
focus of international relations away from nation-states and
their national interests. Many scholars believe that the
interest of the state should remain on a level below that of
supra-national organizations, e.g. the UN. Second, there
exists a rejection of the Realist's emphasis on power for
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evaluating a nation-state's foreign policy goals. Third, the
term national interest is not specific enough for any
usefulness in the rigorous methodology of modern social
sciences. (1978, p. xiii)
Catagorizing Nuechterlein into the Realist or
the Behavioralist school is difficult. He criticized the
shortcomings of the Realists' interpretation of national
interest, particularly its rejection of the role of public
opinion and the political process. He defined four national
interests as follows (not in any order and not mutually
exclusive )
:
1. "defense" — survival of the state
2. "economic" — promotion of material well-being
3. "world order" -- calm world environment
4. "ideological" -- nation's values
At any given time, a nation may perceive a
threat to these interests in varying degrees. Hence, four
intensities were proposed as follows:
1. "survival" -- state's existence threatened
2. "vital" -- threat of military action involved
3. "major" -- issues that threaten to become
vital
4. "peripheral" -- interests of private citizens
abroad
Survival issues are relatively easy to discern;
they normally apply only to defense interests. However, the
vital interests tend to be difficult to determine. Vital and
major issues are the day-to-day issues of strategic planners
who are involved with contingency plans. Nuechterlein
proposed a means of evaluating costs and benefits to
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ascertain whether an interest is vital, i.e., threatening to
require the possible use of military force to resolve. The
four interests and intensities were constructed in a matrix
(Figure 6) to visually aid potential decision-makers. To
use, the decision-maker places an "X" or "US" in the
applicable four blocks out of the 16; a "USSR" or "NK" (North
Korea), for example, may also be placed in the matrix as
applicable. In this manner, one may assess the US national
interest in a crisis with respect to the adversary.
Intensities





Fig. 6 Nuechterlein 's National
Interest Matrix
b. Strategic Studies
Strategic studies scholars approach the national
interest from a different perspective. Nevertheless some
overlap between the two fields exist. For instance,
Nuechterlein and Rosenau both presented papers at a 1982
National Security Affairs Conference. Nuechterlein presented
his matrix but proposed a more specific set of US national
28
interests based on geography. In order of decreasing
priority, his list is a follows:
1. North and Central America, northern South
America
2. Western Europe, Egypt, and Israel
3. USSR
4. East Asia (excluding Korea)
5. South America
6. Mid East and Persian Gulf
7. Africa. (Heyns, p. 29)
Rosenau maintained that construction of a coherent national
strategy was not possible and proposed continuing on an ad
hoc basis (Heyns, p. 30).
Weigley (1973) observed that the formulation of
American strategy has broadened from the Clausewitzian
concept of military strategy to the present-day national
strategy, due to the suffocating threat of worldwide
communism. Accordingly, post-WW II US strategy should
encompass "the use of the nation's total resources to defend
and advance the national interest." (p. xix) Craig and
Gilbert (1986) were even more emphatic that military strategy
of the past was unsuitable for today. They said that raison
d 'etat has become an important component of strategy and it
included "rational determination of a nation's vital
interests. ..." (p. 863)
Ken Booth (1978) has looked at the unique
American perspective of war and peace. He criticized the
inflexible nature of some nation's supposedly coherent
national interests. For instance, the German 1914 Schlieffen
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Plan and Britain's 1956 Suez debacle were examples where
clear interests led to aggressive actions. Booth cited the
US containment theory and its corollary, the domino theory,
as another example. He concluded that "it is but one step
from having a highly developed sense of threat to engaging in
preemptive strategies...." (p. 8)
Of the strategic studies scholars, John Collins
has written most widely on the idea of national interest. He
utilized the term grand strategy as a level of national
action higher than national strategy. The development of
grand strategy included four interactive components. First,
national security interests were "highly generalized
abstractions that reflect each state's basic wants and
needs." (1973, p. 1) These were by necessity ambiguous
because, while all US citizens concur on defending the
Constitution's goals, no one can agree on a specific plan
(1973, p. xxiv) .
Second, national security objectives were simply
"what a country is trying to do" and have a time span
associated with them. Third, national security policies were
"a set of ground rules" for implementing or determining
national security interests. Finally, national security
committments designated specific claims to US resources, such
as geographic regions. (Collins, 1973, pp. 3-4)
Harry Summers (1982) has analyzed US national
security strategy during the Vietnam War. He cited the three
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primary tasks assigned by the Congress to the US Armed Forces
(through the various National Security Acts of 1947 - 1959):
1. defend territorial integrity
2. guarantee domestic security
3. protect and enhance US national interests,
including the security of areas vital to
those interests, (p. 183)
The US has invoked the last mission the most often to send
armed forces overseas. Summers critized the situation in
Vietnam where there was no consensus on what interests were
being protected or enhanced.
One of the foremost strategists of the nuclear
age, Bernard Brodie, was more concerned with nuclear war and
its prevention in The Absolute Weapon (1946) than the
formulation of national interest. However his abhorrence of
war led him to criticize an idea sometimes confused with
national interest:
"The wholesale conversion of mankind away from those
parochial attitudes bound up in nationalism -is a
consummation devoutly to be wished, and where possible, to
be actively promoted." (p. 22)
Later, Brodie developed the argument that deterrence would
enable a well-defended nation to pursue its true security
(p. 107).
Henry Kissinger devoted the last chapter of
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957) to "the need for
doctrine." He wrote that "the value of power depends above
all on the purposes for which it is to be used," but did not
address the issue of national purpose, (p. 403) His concern
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was directed toward the need for an national strategy and US
organizational and cultural obstacles to it.
Samuel Huntington (1961) discussed an issue
related to national interest which occurred in the late
1950s: the debate over national purpose. This discussion
dissolved in a similar fashion as the national interest
debate because people could not agree on national goals
beyond territorial defense and below the generalities of the
Constitution. He succintly summed up the dilemma: "Purpose
demands priorities; priorities require choice; choice means
controversy." (p. 442)
The fundamental concept of Lockean government
affected the formulation of national security goals,
according to Huntington. Locke, and Abraham Lincoln in the
Gettysburg Address, assumed that government by the people
meant an identity of interests between the two. However,
international relations is by definition one of government
versus government competition for prestige, influence, etc.
Therefore, "the individual in society has little interest in
these stakes so long as his government maintains the minimum
prerequisites of security and order." (p. 443)
A discussion of strategists that excluded
Clausewitz and Mahan would be incomplete. Clausewitz's On
War dealt almost exclusively with the act of war itself
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and its three political objectives: destroying the enemy's
military, conquering his country, and subduing the enemy's
will (p. 123). However, he wrote during the period where
wars were, for the first time, being carried out on behalf of
the "affairs of State." Clausewitz was undecided whether
this would always be the case, as he believed it should, or
"whether a separation of the interests of the Government from
those of the people will again gradually arise." (p. 386)
Rapaport, in his introduction to On War , summarized
Clausewitz's philosophy of international relations as
follows:
"Since among the goals of all states is that of increasing
their own power at the expense of that of other states, the
interests of states ... are always in conflict.... There-
fore war is a normal phase in the relations among
states." (emphasis in original )( Clausewitz, p. 631)
Mahan's writings reflected the era of American
expansion following the Spanish-American War. In 1900 he
wrote
:
"The first law of states, as of men, is self-preservation -
a term which cannot be narrowed to the bare tenure of a
stationary round of existence.... Growth is a property of
healthful life... but it does not imply the right to
insure by just means whatsoever contributes to national
progress." (Mahan, p. 543)
Livezey (1981) devoted an entire chapter of Mahan on Sea
Power to Mahan's concept of the national interest and probed
Mahan's view that "nations operated ... according to national
interests and moral sentiments." (Livezey, p. 281)
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4 . Determining the National Interest
The research thus far has progressed along the lines
of explaining the need for strategic planners to understand
the national interest and reviewing various conceptions of
it. The scholars reviewed here have given their version of
it, criticized it, or at least acknowledged it as a facet of
foreign and defense policy. None of the scholars delved into
the origins of the national interest, perhaps because the
origins of an ambiguous subject would be even more murky than
the subject itself.
Morgenthau, Collins, and Huntington mentioned that
national interests were derived somehow from the
Constitution. Others stated that the national interest
derived from the national identity and morals. The former
involves a discussion of political philosophy; the latter of
ethics and philosophy. These topics together require a
knowledge of metaphysics for a satisfactory explication.
One can readily see that formulation of the national
interest can occur at several levels of thought. Frank Teti
has proposed a model of knowledge-making that incorporated
and simplified the various plateaus of the national interest:
1. metaphysical: concern for the ultimate basis of
knowledge
2. world view: romanticism, culture, national
character, idealism
3. theoretical: specific theories of politics,
economics, sociology, theology,
military science
4. societal: the collective memory of society
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5. action: the reality of state's behavior in the
international environment
6. institutionalization: repetitive action becomes
accepted. (Teti, 1987)
Most scholars reviewed in the previous section
confined their views to levels five and six; Clausewitz
developed a theory of war that fits into level three. The
Declaration of Independence and Consitutution incorporated
level four views of tyranny under George III and level three
political philosophy theories of John Locke. Woodrow Wilson
appeared to have determined foreign policy at level two by
dreaming of Idealism. Level one lies at the very heart of
any political issue: right v. wrong, absolutism v.
relativism, intuition v. empiricism, deism v. theism,
idealism v. materialism, and what is v. what ought to be.
Teti's model provides a way of organizing thought on
the national interest. It channels the thought process into
looking at means (levels one to four) and ends (levels five
and six). Also the model is structured similar to the
"levels of analysis" pyramid of international relations that
looks at state's behavior at three levels based on increasing
number of variables: systemic, nation-state, and
idiosyncratic
.
A full discussion of levels one through four is beyond
the scope of this paper. A hasty tour through pertinent
metaphysical ideas will provide some flavor of the complex
means associated with policy making. Several authors are
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relevant, though, for the interested student of levels two
through four. Frankel (1969), Shy (1976), Van Dyke (1962),
and Hall (1976) address national culture and values.
Hamilton, Jay, and Madison (1937), McCloskey and Zaller
(1984), Nobel prize-winning economist Milton Friedman (1962),
St. Thomas Aquinas (1947), and Becker (1970) expound on the
theory of democracies and Christian teachings on Just War.
Political commentators and journalists serve as society's
memory bank. Publishing magnate Henry Luce (1941), Walter
Lippman (1943 and 1955), Destler, Gelb, and Lake (1984),
Theodore White (1982 and 1986), and Will (1978 and 1987)
mirror the current issues of society.
A discussion of metaphysics may begin with Aristotle.
His idea of the mean between too much and too little
illustrated the difference between objective and relative.
The mean between "excess" and "deficiency" of a thing or
issue was objectively the same for everyone, but not
relatively. For example, the mean between eating 5000
calories of food and 500 calories of food per day is the same
objectively: 2750 calories. However, for a professional
football player it may not be enough and for a race horse
jockey it may still be too much. Therefore, an individual
should follow the mean, of say, moral virtue, but recognize
that it is different for each individual, (p. 190)
Irving Kristol (1987) has noted a shift in the terms
morals and ethics. The terms used to be almost synonomous.
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But in the last half century, morals have lost out in
popularity. The old subject of moral philosophy attempted to
justify, without reference to divine inspiration, the major
precepts of the Judeo-Christian moral code. Today, ethics
are "value-free" and the subject of ethics probes only
"logical contradictions" and "logical dilemmas." Kristol
criticized the teaching of ethics without value judgements.
Although Kristol wrote his essay in the context of graduate
business education, the issues apply equally well to
politicians, civil servants, and military officers.
A recent bestseller, The Closing of the American Mind
(Bloom, 1987), recommended that Americans study more
philosophy; such understanding could improve the declining
fortunes of America. This idea is gaining popularity in the
education reform movement and may have particular relevance
to strategic planners.
Individuals in national security affairs tend to have
their primary education in engineering, the hard sciences
(physics, chemistry, math, computers), or the social sciences
(business administration, political science/international
relations, economics). The humanities (philosophy, history,
literature, ethics) are not strongly represented among modern
technocrats. A recent San Jose Mercury News (1987) editorial
linked the two: "As the sciences provide the means, the
humanities guide us to choose the right ends." The
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humanities allows one to understand levels one through four
of Teti 's model
.
Understanding philosophy and agreeing on its precepts
are still two different items. This lays the foundation for
the ultimate dilemma: how can a nation exist that does not
agree on either the means or the ends? It is common to say
that most Americans agree on the ends, and that the Democrats
and Republicans hash out differences of means. But
conservative commentator Patrick Buchanan (1987) claimed that
"Americans of Left and Right no longer share the same
religion, the same values, the same codes of morality, we
only inhabit the same piece of land."
5. The Constitution and the US National Interest
Previous section headings have included the term "the
national interest." Long explanations of the concept of
national interest are behind the reader. Now it is necessary
to expound on "the US national interest".
Intellectuals tend to bemoan the loss of certitude in
today's world. However, in one area, certitude does exist in
the US -- that the Constitution is the highest law of the
land. The fact that it is higher than the politician's
constituents is amply demonstrated by the oath of office that
each federal office holder and elected official swears.
People interpret the Constitution differently, hence the need
for a Supreme Court; but all agree that it is the supreme law
of the land.
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The natural rights philosophy identified the
fundamental condition of equality among men as a right passed
down from God. Thomas Jefferson borrowed heavily from
Locke's natural rights philosophy when he authored the
Declaration of Independence (Becker, 1970); the Constitution
is also based on the natural rights philosophy (Adler, 1987).
To Mahan, the national interest had two distinct
elements — political and moral. For purposes of this essay,
"political" means the politico-military-diplomatic routine of
the US government. The "moral" sentiment is based on John
Locke's natural rights philosophy, as expressed in the
Declaration of Independence and Constitution. Since the
Constitution is the supreme law and comprises the moral
principles of John Locke, the moral component of the national
interest is based on the Constitution and is superior to the
political component.
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address is another bastion of
certitude. No one denies that the US government is "of the
people, by the people, and for the people." Furthermore, the
Declaration of Independence represents truth in the US. It
states that governments are instituted for the protection of
certain inalienable rights, such as life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.
These rights could not be protected if a state allowed
itself to fall victim to another state's aggression. US
Catholic Bishops (1986) wrote that, based on St. Thomas
39
Aquinas' Just War criteria (1947), states not only have a
right to defend their populace, they have an obligation to
defend
:
"A people threatened with an unjust aggression, or already
its victim, may not remain passively indifferent...."
(emphasis added) (p. 242)
Therefore, this argument leads inescapably to the conclusion
that self preservation is and ought to be the primary
function of a state; its foremost national interest.
This thought process has profound implications for the
study of national interest. If self-preservation based on
moral laws is the primary state task, then a new national
interest-public interest paradigm can be constructed. Since
the highest goal of a state is self-preservation, national
security interest is the name assigned to the
Constitutionally-based moral component. Figure 7 has a











Fig. 7 Constitutional Paradigm
of the National Security
Interest
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The national security interests of the US represent
enduring goals of both the nation and the state and include
self-preservation. These national security interests are
striking in their simplicity and come directly out of the
Preamble to the Constitution:
1. establish justice
2. insure domestic tranquility
3. provide for the common defense
4. promote the general welfare
5. secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves
and our posterity.
Because these national security interests are based
explicitly on the Constitution, they embody rare consensus
among the conflicting groups of Walter Lippmann 's The Public
Philosophy (1955): the people (voters) and THE PEOPLE (the
collective society) (pp. 32-36). The national security
interests represent certitude in a fragmented nation-state
with precious little of it.
The national interests of the US now no longer seek
to aspire to the heights of glittering generalities that
masquerade as enduring values. Instead they are politically
derived, just as the Constitution allows. The US national
interest is what the President proclaims and the Congress
approves and may also be a compromise between the two, again,
just as the Constitution allows. The US national interest
also may be changed by Presidential election, just as the
Constitution allows. The US national interest may be wrong,
just as the Constitution allows. The White House has
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published a set of national interests that fit into the
Constitutional paradigm presented here:
1. The survival on the United States as a free
and independent nation....
2. A healthy and growing economy.
3. The growth of freedom, democratic institutions,
and free market economies....
4. A stable and secure world....
5. The health and vigor of U.S. alliance relation-
ships." (The White House, 1987)
This formulation of the national interest is different
from the standard terminology of international relations and
strategic studies scholars. Most search for a national
interest that does not change with Presidential elections.
But in reality, the national interest does change. This fact
is the key difference between the national security interest
and the national interest. Jimmy Carter's national interest
was founded on human rights; his priority was completely
overturned by the Ronald Reagan (Vance, 1986). Many scholars
have striven for a national interest that is not wrong. But
Senator Warren Rudman (Republican of New Hampshire) declared
in the Iran-Contra hearings on 13 July 1987 that the American
people have the Constitutional right to be wrong. In
summary, the national interest can be changed, be wrong, and
be subjected to the vagaries of the American political
process
.
While different from most versions of national
interest, the Figure 7 paradigm is somewhat similar to
Collins' grand strategy components. The national security
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interests as defined here concern protection and enhancement
of five items in the Preamble to the Constitution and occupy
a level above grand strategy. The national interest,
explicitly spelled out by the White House, is synonomous with
Collins' national security interests. The White House's
national security objectives, which evolved from the national
interest, are equivalent to Collins' national security
objectives. However, the terminology used in Figure 7
differs from Weinberger's. His national security interests
(values and geographical assets) are equivalent to the
national interests used in Figure 7 and the White House
(Weinberger, 1987, p. 9).
Clearly the national interest and national security
interest terms deserve standardization. Without it, an
effective model of strategic planning cannot be developed.
Figure 7 provides such a basis for standardization. This
formulation allow the Congress and Executive to invoke
national interest to describe their own vision of US foreign
and defense issues. Figure 7 also imposes a measure of
symmetry on national and public interest; each are
politically derived from the electoral process and are
subordinate to the enduring goals of the nation, the national
security interests.
6 . Criticism of the Constitutional Paradigm
The critics may charge that this has been a clever
academic exercise to disabuse any substantive meaning from
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the term national interest; it ended the debate without ever
having solved the issue. Some criticism is justifiable. The
Behavioralists would still not be satisfied with The White
House promulgation of the national interest. The Realists
might object to advancing the cause of free market economies
instead of power and influence. The Globalists would
complain that The White House version is too nationalistic.
More cynical students of political science or history,
and lawyers steeped in the adversarial process, may argue
that the Constitution is not set in concrete. They would
argue that the confirmation hearings of Judge Robert Bork
amply demonstrated the hazards involved in viewing the
Constitution as the Founding Fathers did. Judge Bork, an
adherent of "original intent," even conceded that
"constitutional intent is somewhat indeterminate or unclear"
and inevitably generates conflicts in the "application of
written words to modern circumstances...." (Kramer, 1987, p.
20) Nevertheless, the Taylor quote at the beginning of this
chapter answers all criticisms.
Historians may point to how President Lincoln raised
Army troops in May 1861 in direct violation of the
Constitution, which assigns that function solely to the
Congress. Later in the Civil War, Lincoln again violated
the Constitution by disbursing Treasury funds to three
private citizens for the purpose of procuring desperately
needed military supplies. (Binkley, 1962, pp. 136-139)
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Congressman Lincoln even accused President Polk of
"unconstitutionally" starting the 1848 Mexican War (Sandburg,
1926, p. 367).
Regardless of these potential criticisms of the new
paradigm, the concept remains viable for strategic planners.
A strategic planner, like a business manager, needs to
develop strategies to marshall resources based on a clear set
of objectives (Hayes, p. 112). This paradigm shows the
planner the source, right or wrong, for those objectives:
the national interests articulated by the President.
One could argue that just because a given objective is
the nation's stated policy, that does not mean that it is in
the national interest. DeTocqueville solved this conceptual
dilemma in the 1830s. He observed that a democracy promotes
the well-being of the greatest number. Therefore, even
though the majority who supports legislation are " subject to
error . . . they cannot have an interest opposed to their own
advantage." (emphasis added) (p. 238)
The next section will show an example of the strategic
planning process working from the bottom up, instead of from
the top down, as portrayed in Figure 7. This aberation in
strategic planning is called the technological imperative.
Under this hypothesis, national interest and strategy evolve
after the capability is created.
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C. STRATEGIC PLANNING IN REVERSE: THE TECHNOLOGICAL
IMPERATIVE
"In the councils of government we must guard against
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the
military-industrial complex."
-President Eisenhower, 1961
1 . History of Military Technology
In his Farewell Address of January 1961, President
Eisenhower made his famous warning against the military-
industrial complex. Although pundits took his statement out
of context from a rambling speech, Eisenhower was really
trying to recognize the fact that until World War II, the US
had a relatively small defense industry. So how did nations
apply scientific innovations to the military in the centuries
before WW II? The role of technological change on military
affairs in this era illustrates essential points regarding
technology and strategy, and, as will be seen, technology-
doctrine and technology-tactics.
From antiquity to medieval times, most new weapons
evolved from craftsmen or inventors. Since nation-states did
not exist, a rational process involving government
formulation of national interest and military strategy did
not exist. The development process was short, and the
planning crude. For instance, Bernard Brodie (1973) wrote
that if a soldier developed a weapon, he did it in response
to a combat problem arising out of battlefield tactics. If
an inventor developed one, it was the result of new
metallurgical applications, (p. 8)
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Moral principles also played a role in weapons
development. In 1139, Pope Innocent II prohibited the use of
the hand crossbow because it was "hateful to God and unfit
for Christians." (Brodie, 1973, p. 35) Also, Brodie
discovered that the father of the science of ballistics,
mindful of the potential of his knowledge, refused to divulge
his calculations until his country faced imminent invasion
(1973, p. 10)
.
The 1500s witnessed a period of major advances in
naval and maritime capability. The invention of the compass
and other improvements in open-ocean navigation led to
sailing ships and exploration. This produced a revolution in
naval warfare by ending the 2,000 year reliance on the
oar-propelled galley. At about the same time, gunpowder
achieved wide acceptance. The marriage of open-ocean sailing
ships with long-range gunnery permitted the divorce of naval
strategy from land strategy. (Dupuy, 1980, p. 119)
The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 marked the beginning
of a new era in military affairs. The modern system of
nation-states forced standardization of military equipment
and establishment of military hierarchies (Brodie, 1973, p.
75). The 17th century also saw the publication of Sir Isaac
Newton's Principia which ushered in the Age of Reason and
accelerated technological innovation.
Weapons development was slow, however, until the
Industrial Revolution. Many innovations of truly strategic
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import in this era evolved out of civilian technology; the
telegrc.ph and railroad, for instance, facilitated the control
and movement of vast quantities of men and material over long
distances. In naval warfare, steam power, which grew from a
need to pump water out of English coal mines, forced
countries to begin thinking strategically about overseas
coaling stations (Dupuy, p. 203).
The evolution of the submarine, on the other hand,
illustrated the development of strictly military technology.
Although Leonardo da Vinci received credit for the first
submarine design, David Bushnell constructed the first
successful combat submarine in 1773, which was used in the
American Revolution. A quarter century later, Robert Fulton
made a four-man submarine for Napoleon. By World War I, the
submarine was an accepted weapon of naval warfare. Its
evolution, from concept design to acceptance, required almost
400 years.
In World War I military science and technology had
reached a point of complexity where governments began to get
involved. For the first time, technical achievements were
accomplished by "teams working under pressure to solve
specific weapons problems." (Brodie, 1973, p. 172) This
trend accelerated during the interwar years with the British
development of radar.
Holley (1986) observed that Britain's work on radar
in the 1930s demonstrated both technological and doctrinal
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foresight. Sir Henry Tizard led an Air Ministry committee in
1934 to generate solutions to the Luftwaffe bomber threat.
Tizard pursued a little understood characteristic of radio
waves for two years and produced a radar with a 75 mile
range. But Tizard went beyond his charter as a member of a
scientific advisory committee and coordinated the development
of tactical doctrine for its use. Through his initiative,
the Royal Air Force had a workable radar system and a
doctrine to guide pilots and air controllers in time for WW
II. (pp. 28-32)
While radar defined the state of the art in the
interwar years, military research and development
establishments also pursued low technology. One example of
how low technology made a difference in strategy concerns
aircraft drop tanks for fuel. Drop tanks would allow
fighters to escort the longer-range bombers all the way to
the target. This concept travelled up the chain of command
but was rejected in May 1939 because the Army Air Corps
thought bombers did not need escort. The idea was
resurrected in 1941 and used successfully throughout the war.
The delay, however, in introducing drop tanks nearly
invalidated the doctrine of precision daylight bombing, "the
premise on which the whole prevailing air power strategy
rested." (Holley, 1985, p. 21)
By World War II, entire national scientific and
technological resources were mobilized under direct and
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indirect government supervision to support the war effort.
The capstone of this effort was the Manhattan Project. Its
history is too well known to repeat here, but overall it
sheds some additional light on the strategy-technology issue.
Collins (1973) wrote that no national leadership before WW II
could have pursued an atomic bomb based on a military
strategy that called for such an enormous increase in
destructive power. He concluded that "Project Manhattan
followed the discovery of uranium fission, not vice versa."
(emphasis in or iginal )( Collins, 1973, p. 206)
Although this capsule description of weapons
development can hardly do justice to a significant historical
field, it provides the background for some compelling issues.
First, some of the most strategic innovations, such as the
railroad and telegraph, came from civilian technology, not
military. One notes the same situation today with computers,
an invention that has had far-reaching consequences for the
military, but hardly falls under the category of
technological imperative. Superconductivity is another
civilian-led field which may affect future military weapons
(Johnson, 1987). Second, technical progress is clearly
capable of generating changes in tactics, doctrine, and
administration. For instance, steam ships created a demand
for a skilled engineering officer corps, allowed staight line
navigation across the ocean, and introduced "crossing the T"
into naval tactics (Dupuy, p. 204).
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Third, weapons innovations generally do not produce a
wholesale change in military strategy. Mahan argued his case
for seapower in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History,
1660-1783 using historical examples of sailing ships. Aside
from coaling stations, the introduction of steam ships did
not change a maritime nation's military strategy much from
protecting commerce and sailing powerful battle fleets. On
the other hand, when technology does affect high level
military strategy, such as precision day-light strategic
bombing and the nuclear attacks on Japan, it seems to occur
during wartime.
Fourth, the question of which came first, technology
or strategy (or doctrine or tactics) assumes a chicken and
egg quality. For instance, Sir Henry Tizard was assigned to
solve a military problem by searching for suitable
technology, i.e. strategy was driving the pursuit of
technology. But someone (Dr. Robert Watson-Watt of the
National Physics Laboratory) had to sell Tizard on the
existence and potential of radio wave detection. Therefore,
the technological imperative school would blame Watson-Watt
for "fueling the arms race." Lastly, and most importantly,
technology affects warfare at different levels -- strategic,
doctrinal, and tactical.
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2 . The Technological Imperative
a. Description
Ralph Lapp, a physicist formerly with the
Manhattan Project, is the elder statesman of the
"technological imperative" school. The technological
imperative goes by many names, such as technological momentum
or technological determinism. It describes the process by
which technology allegedly acquires a life of its own and
compels man to procure the latest technology for its own
sake. Lapp wrote in 1970 of the technological imperative:
"when technology beckons, man is helpless." (p. 178)
The concept of technological momentum received
its earliest articulation long before its official debut in
the ABM/MIRV debate of the late 1960s. The French political
author Raymond Aron, reflecting in 1954 on the massive
destruction of World War I, hinted at it when he wrote that
"technical excess" over the years had elevated ideology into
a major war objective. That is to say, only amorphous
principles such as self-determination could justify the
absurd destruction of the war. (p. 26)
Of course weapons improvement was an ongoing
process long before the late 1960s. The technological
imperative school tends to not distinguish between routine
weapons improvement and radical conceptual advancement based
on new principles. For instance, the MIRV technology which
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evolved the technological imperative criticism was already
partially in existence in the form of Multiple Reentry
Vehicles (MRV).
President Eisenhower's Farewell Address contained
more than just the well-known warning about the military-
industrial complex. He also warned of: "the equal and
opposite danger that public policy could itself become the
captive of a scientific-technological elite." (National
Archives, p. 1039) This represents a notable turnaround for
Eisenhower, since he told his first Special Assistant for
Science and Technology, James Killian, Jr., that staff
scientists were the only genuinely altruistic group that
worked in Washington (Kistiakowsky , 1976, p. liii).
Lockheed prepared a 1961 Technical Report which
elaborated on technological momentum. The report offered
several ways of viewing US defense planning; among them was
this statement:
"Arms developed in the United States stem largely not from
farsighted and prior development of policy requirements
reconciled with general state-of-the-art projections, but
rather from the pressure of invention, profit seeking in a
semifree (sic) enterprise system, special interests, and
biased concepts of requirements supported by technological
enthusiasm...." (Barclay, p. 12)
At the time Lockheed was in a unique position to analyze the
defense planning process; it was at the forefront of ICBM and
space satellite technology and, therefore, was sensitive to
America's attitudes in the post-Sputnik and missile-gap era.
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In 1970 the ABM, MIRV, and arms control issues
coalesced into the theme for the 10th Annual Pugwash
Conference: "The Impact of New Technologies on the Arms
Race." Participants sought to distinguish between
"stabilizing" and "destabilizing" weapons technologies which
fueled what they described as an "action-reaction" arms race.
Technology, they believed, was a force that eroded "political
control over doomsday." (Greenwood, 1971, p. 12) Also in
1970, Herbert York argued that "technological hardsell"
brought on an overreaction in weapons procurement (p. 24).
Lapp popularized the issue in his 1970 book, Arms
Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology . He earned
his credentials as a physicist against nuclear weapons in
1962 with Kill and Overkill . His 1970 work argued the case
for the effects of imperious technology with metaphors and
scathing criticism. The technicians, he wrote, who designed
nuclear warheads were men "of an engineering mentality, which
is little educated to a sense of social responsibility."
(Lapp, 1970, p. 5)
Of the Manhattan Project, he argued that its
original charter was to develop a workable atomic weapon
before Germany. However, once the Allies defeated Germany on
8 May 1945, he lamented, the US continued the project without
a thought. Lapp concluded that: "If the A-bomb could be
made, it would be made." (1970, p. 173) Lapp summed up his
view on defense planning as follows:
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"Somewhere along this road to destruction, man lost his way
and let his steps be guided by the compass of technology.
Whenever a new weapon possibility beckoned, society meekly
moved in this direction, without questioning the
consequences. The natural sciences, for so long supreme in
the grandeur of their isolation, became the great
dictators of weapons events." (1970, p. 3)
Literature on technological determinism waned
following the 1972 SALT I and ABM arms control agreements.
During the ensuing detente period, US strategic forces
remained at a plateau, the arms control/technological
determinist advocates held influential positions in
government, and the aerospace industry fell on hard times
following the end of the Vietnam War and the Apollo Program.
By the late 1970s, the B-l bomber, cruise
missile, Trident program, and SALT II debate caused public
attention to be focused on strategic weapons procurement once
again. One analyst wrote that "development of military
capabilities has a momentum" and that justification for
weapons 's use is not formulated until afterwards." (Molineu,
1978, p. 16) A former British defense official echoed this
sentiment
:
"During the twenty years or so that I myself was
professionally involved in these matters, weapons came
first and rationalizations and policies followed."
(Zuckerman, 1984, p. 7)
Colin Gray (1982) addressed three non-exclusive
propositions for relating technology, strategic theory, and
national policy. One of those ideas was the technological
imperative, which he defined as technical change which
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ultimately generates "congruent theoretical and policy
changes." (p. 16) Although no advocate of the technological
imperative school, Gray contended that a poorly defined
military doctrine or defense policy could lead to a
"relatively permissive environment" for weapons research
(p. 19).
The most recent contribution to the literature on
technological imperative was published by Thee (1986). The
author argued that technological momentum shaped strategy and
that modern military technology has led the world astray
(p. 1). Furthermore, the long gestation period of new
weapons, over 10 years, gave weapons "a momentum quite
impervious to socio-political restraint." (p. 16)
Proponents of the technological imperative school
tend to disparingly view technology and the arms race as an
inevitable phenemenon. However, this viewpoint has several
shortcomings. First, the fact that technology is not an
inevitable phenemenon is demonstrated by the Soviet Union,
which forecasts technology and includes it in its long range
planning. Also, responding to enemy weapons improvements may
be in a state's national interest. A government would be
negligent to not counter a hostile adversary's new weapon.
Several related defense issues do not fall under
the category of technological imperative. For instance,
there is little debate about the US policy to rely on
technology to meet the Soviet overwhelming conventional
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weapon threat. The Secretary of Defense formalized this in
1987 with his policy of "competitive strategies," which is
designed to take advantage of US technical leads over the
Soviets (DOD, 1987, pp. 65-69). Second, debate on force
levels once a weapon has been selected includes a different
set of arguments, such as whether the government may be
overreacting to an enemy threat (Ball, 1980, and Kuenne,
1966). Lastly, the scientist's influence on major policy
decisions, e.g., nuclear test ban debate, is a more general
issue than the quite specific technological imperative
(Wohlstetter, 1963).
b. Causes
The technological imperative supposedly causes
defense planners to acquire exotic new technologies without
consideration of military strategy or national interests.
What might be the underlying causes of such a condition?
Four reasons exist to explain the technological
imperative. First, former Secretary of Defense Brown wrote
that "uncertainty is necessarily the lot of the planner,
since he deals with the future." (1967, p. 277) This compels
defense planners to chose flexible weapons to meet future
needs. The obvious downside of creating multipurpose weapons
is that a weapon may turn out to be most useful for a
nonexistent mission (Head, 1978, p. 547).
Second, the adversarial process defines the US
democratic process. One is either an advocate of a cause,
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program, or bill, or one is a critic of it. In the case of
weapons procurement, it is hardly a novel idea that
organizations push to have their programs approved (Ball,




2. scientists at Defense and Energy labs,
3. military strategists at think tanks,
4. Department of Defense "in house" technical experts.
(Thee, 1986, p. 17)
Thee, like other technological determinists , tends
to lay the blame on the military-industrial complex.
However, one could also make the case that the Congress and
the White House belong on the list.
Third, the US has a comparative advantage in
technology over the Soviet Union. Also, the US and Western
democracies cannot meet the Soviet threat man for man and
weapon for weapon. Therefore the US "substitutes technology
for manpower" and, thus, technology has a tendency to
influence both strategy and doctrine. (Head, 1978, p. 548)
3. Summary
One of the criticisms by the military reform movement
is that a decoupling exists among military technology,
military strategy, and operational concepts (Sanders, 1985,
p. 157). For instance, US defense critic Edward Luttwak
wrote that without a national strategy, "unguided technical
ambition will overwhelm defense planning." (Luttwak, 1981,
p. 16) Cogent strategic planning requires a formulation of
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the national interest and military strategy; the
technological imperative destroys the rationality of the
process
.
The technological imperative issue only lends itself
to multi-service strategic weapons. Nuclear weapons and
their delivery vehicles have direct and permanent links with
military strategy and national interest. Single service
conventional weapons do not have this link; they mostly
affect doctrine, not strategy.
The implications of technology driving doctrine are
not as severe as technology driving strategy. For instance,
if an engineer discovered a radically new way for a torpedo
to measure doppler (a characteristic of sound waves), this
might affect anti-submarine warfare (ASW) doctrine. This
would be a welcome improvement to the submarine community,
but would hardly affect the nation's military strategy. On
the other hand if this same engineer discovered a radically
new method of non-acoustic submarine detection, this could
completely revise the way strategists think of finding the
enemy's and protecting our own FBM submarines, i.e. would
affect military strategy. Therefore, the technology-doctrine
and technology-tactics relationships do not fall under the
technological-imperative rubric.
In a sense, tactics are designed to make up for the
shortcomings of new weapons. Even without shortcomings, the
military expects to develop new tactics and doctrine based on
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new hardware. For instance, one US Navy admiral stated that
his generation was passing to the next generation new
weapons, such as the Vertical Launch System for missiles; the
goal of the latter group v/as to determine the best ways to
deploy it. (Metcalf, 1S87) Vice Admiral Metcalf's
observation is entirely accurate and supports the contention
that technology-doctrine and technology-tactics interaction
is not a harmful relationship. It also illustrates another
deficiency in Figure 4 -- the need for a feedback loop from
capabilities to service doctrine.
The next section will consist of a case study of the
Polaris FBM system. As a strategic weapons system that grew
out of an exciting period in US technological development, it
provides a means of testing the validity of the technological
imperative case.
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III. THE POLARIS: A CASE STUDY
"Move deterrence out to sea,
Where real estate is free,
And where it's far away from me."
-Ralph Lapp, 1962, p. 75
A. INTRODUCTION
Polaris lends itself to a study of national interest and
technological imperative for several reasons. First, it is a
strategic nuclear weapon. Instead of affecting or evolving
from strictly US Navy doctrine or tactics, it has distinct
links to the nation's military strategy. Second, the Polaris
system is narrow in scope, which allows effective analysis.
The development of the ICBM, while illustrating the same
concepts, would have been unwieldy, since that task would
include the Atlas, Thor , Jupiter, Titan, Minuteman, and
Polaris projects. Lastly, Polaris represents more than just
an exercise in weapons procurement, e.g., a debate on force
levels with respect to a limited budget. It represents one
of the largest technological advancements ever attempted by
the US Government (Sapolsky, 1972, p. 160). In short,





History of the Navy's ballistic missile program began
in 1946. By that time, the US had set up German rocket
scientists in its government laboratories. The Germans, led
by Dr. Werner Von Braun, possessed proven expertise in both
types of missile design — cruise missiles (as represented by
the V-l "buzz" bomb) and ballistic missiles (V-2 missile).
These Germans had also experimented with launching a V-2 from
a submarine, but Army-Navy rivalry killed the project.
By 1946, the US Navy was looking at guided missiles
as a means of deflecting attacks on the Navy's usefulness in
the nuclear age (Baldwin, 1946, p. 19). However, most of the
technical work on ballistic missiles was marred either
directly or indirectly by pernicious interservice rivalry.
For instance, the Army Air Force and Army argued over whether
a ballistic missile was a flying weapon or artillery (Perry,
1967, p. 3). The Army Air Force and Navy worked out an
agreement on roles and missions regarding nuclear weapons in
the Key West and Newport Conferences of 1947. Unfortunately,
controversy erupted between the Army Air Force and Navy
regarding the inaccurate B-36 bomber and the accurate carrier
aviation in the late 1940s. (Sapolsky, 1972, p. 5)
The US at that time held a monopoly on nuclear
weapons and their means of delivery. This advantage led the
US into a false sense of security regarding missile
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technology. The US funded ballistic missile research at low
levels in the late 1940 's for two reasons: (1) the US
strategic posture did not demand a new weapon, and (2) the
new weapon was not technically feasible (Perry, p. 1).
The false sense of security was shattered when the
Soviets exploded their first atomic weapon in August 1949,
years ahead of US predictions. Less than a year later, the
North Korean invasion of South Korea exposed the US nuclear
arsenal as a paper tiger. Tired of the Korean War and
unhappy with US defense policies, President Eisenhower
entered office in 1953 promising to resolve the Korean
conflict and bring fiscal responsibility to the nation.
2. 1953-1955
The new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arthur
Radford, shared the President's views of defense planning and
articulated them in the "New Look" speech of 14 December 1953
(Eisenhower, 1963, p. 449). The New Look recognized the
US-USSR competition as a long term struggle that had to be
reconciled with the nation's material well being.
Accordingly, the New Look reallocated money among the five
functional accounts in the Department of Defense (nuclear
forces, air defense forces, sea forces, etc.) by giving the
most support to nuclear forces. Secretary of the Treasury
Humphrey applauded this plan as a needed improvement; he had
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accused the Truman Administrations of planning for six kinds
of wars -- two for each military branch (Hammond, 1962, p.
433) .
Consistent with the shift toward relying more on
nuclear weapons, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
announced in January 1954 the policy of Massive Retaliation.
Dulles argued that committing huge land forces against the
Communists demonstrated poor military strategy. Henceforth,
he stated, the US would respond to aggression by retaliating
xnstantly "by means and at places of our own choosing."
(Dulles, 1954, p. 108)
Two Presidential committees in the mid 1950s provided
the impetus for ballistic missile development in the context
of the New Look. The first, the Strategic Missiles
Evaluating Committee, led by mathematician John Von Neumann,
met in November 1953 to reduce development costs of the
disparate missile programs. Under the oversight of Special
Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, Trevor Gardner,
the committee reported in February 1954 that ballistic
missile programs required reorganization and expansion, since
technical feasibility was no longer an obstacle (Perry, p.
12). The committee recognized that the US had allowed itself
to fall behind the Soviets in ballistic missile technology.
President Eisenhower confirmed this in his memoirs by noting
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that in fiscal year 1953, the US allocated less money to long
range ballistic missile development than to price support for
peanut farmers (1963, p. 456).
The second committee had an even more profound impact
on ballistic missile development. President Eisenhower
created the Technological Capabilities Panel, led by James
Killian, Jr., in July 1954 to evaluate the vulnerability of
the US to surprise attacks. The Committee submitted to
Eisenhower a report titled "Meeting the Threat of Surprise
Attack," known as the Killian Report, in February 1955. The
report recommended, inter alia , that:
1. the Air Force ICBM program receive the highest
national priority,
2. land- and ship-based IRBMs be evaluated as an
interim measure until ICBM deployment. (Killian,
1977, p. 76)
In what was to be a harbinger of future reports addressing
strategic programs, the Killian Report had a "sense of
urgency without pessimism." (Killian, p. 85)
3. 1955-1960
Until 1S55, the Navy was apathetic regarding
ballistic missile development. It believed that such
development would divert resources from more important areas,
such as readiness. Additionally, the Navy already had a
moderately successful strategic system — the Regulus cruise
missile, introduced in May 1954 (Paolucci, 1970).
Several items care together to steer the Navy bc?ck
towarc: ballistic missile development. First, in August 1955,
Admiral Arleigh Burke was appointed as the new Chief of Naval
Operations and became a tenacious advocate of sea-based
ballistic missiles. Second, the Air Force began eliminating
technical obstacles in its Atlas ICBM program, which it
started directly after the Von Neumann Report. Finally, in
September, the President supported the Killian Report's
recommendation "that a 1500 mile ballistic missile system be
developed. Both land-basing and sea-basing to be considered
(sic)." (SSPO, p. 24)
The Secretary of Defense would not, however, allow
the Navy to independently pursue its own IRBM. Consequently,
a month later, the Joint Army Navy Ballistic Fissile
Committee (JANBMC) was established. The Navy inherited the
liquid fueled Jupiter IRBM from this merger and, although
disappointed in the arrangement, at least saw an opportunity
for their own missile. In November 1955, the President
placed the Jupiter project on the same high priority as the
Air Force Atlas program. (Beard, 1976, p. 198)
On 17 November 1955, the Secretary of the Navy
2
created the Special Projects Office (SPO) to manage the
ship-based aspects of the Jupiter system. Two weeks later,
the Navy formally announced that development of a
solid-fueled, submarine-launched IRBM (SLBM) was its long
2 The Special Projects Office (SPO) later changed its
name to Strategic Systems Program Office (SSPO).
66
term aim. (SSPO, p. 24) By the end of the year, Rear
Admiral William Raborn, USN, assumed directorship of the SPO.
Under the new Director, the SPO pushed for a unique Navy
IRBM; its requirements were too different to permit a common
missile with the Army. The Secretary of Defense's Scientific
Advisory Committee recommended that the Navy's solid-fueled
project "receive top priority, equal to that of" the
liquid-fueled Jupiter (SSPO, p. 24). The Secretary of Defense
terminated the JANBMC in December 1956 and authorized the
Navy to proceed independently on the Polaris project.
The year 1956 also witnessed the publication of
Albert Wohlstetter 's influential RAND report "Protecting US
Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s." (Kaplan, 1983,
p. 121) This study analyzed the vulnerability of the US
retaliatory force (SAC bombers and future ICBMs) against the
new Soviet fusion weapons. The report evolved from several
studies evaluating vulnerability of overseas SAC bases that
he produced in 1953-54.
Several events occurred in 1957 which accelerated the
Polaris project. First, researchers achieved a significant
breakthrough in designing solid fuel rocket motors, which
affected both the Minuteman and Polaris programs.
Previously, only liquid fueled rockets could develop the
thrust to launch a payload out of the atmosphere. Second,
the Atomic Energy Commission reported that a small nuclear
warhead suitable for Polaris was close at hand. Although
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these were the most important technical issues in 1957, Kahn
and Wiener (1967) listed four other technologies that the US
needed for the Polaris:
1. nuclear propulsion (achieved in January 1955
with USS Nautilus )
2. accurate submarine navigation system
3. small, accurate missile guidance system
4. successful integration of millions of complex, and,
largely "untested" parts. (Kahn and Weiner, p. 67)
Third, the Naval Warfare Analysis Group Study 1
(NAVWAG-1) reported in January 1957 that the SLBM was "more
invulnerable to surprise attack" than other comparable
missiles. NAVWAG-1 concluded that Polaris would make a
significant asset to the US deterrent force. (Rosenberg,
pp. 161, 191)
Fourth, the Gaither Committee Report "Deterrence and
Survival in the Nuclear Age," published in November 1957
praised Polaris. Although known primarily for its
recommendations regarding civil defense, the report also
recommended acceleration of missile projects, in particular
Polaris due to its inherent characteristics of
invulnerability (Rosenberg, p. 157).
The Soviets also influenced the missile program. In
August 1957, they announced the launch of a ballistic missile
that had "covered a huge distance in a brief time." (Frankel,
1957) However, the biggest boost to the Polaris program was
from the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 4 October and 3 November
1957. The Soviet success stunned Americans, including many
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in the government who had believed the Soviets were
technically backward. The Sputnik threw the nation into a
frenzy; ham radio operators listened to the satellite's
beeping, musicians wrote songs about it, and people watched
the Sputnik travel across the sky with binoculars (ABC,
1987) .
Two months after the Sputnik launches, the SPO and
Bureau of Ships recommended to the CNO a proposal for
speeding the timetable under "national emergency" conditions
(SSPO, p. 26). The SPO, already an elite, high-pressure
organization, performed under near-wartime conditions. Its
military staff personnel wore uniforms instead of civilian
clothes in Washington, D.C., its civil service staff worked a
"standard" 5 1/2 day work week, and Rear Admiral Raborn spoke
at pep rallies at defense plants (Sapolsky, pp. 44-45).
After Sputnik, Polaris never suffered from funding problems.
In late 1957, Raborn told a Congressional hearing: "I
received more than a fair share of what I needed to do the
job." (Senate, 1959, p. 101)
In June 1959, the Navy launched the first Polaris
submarine, USS George Washington , at Groton, Connecticut.
Consistent with the emergency nature of the Polaris program
after 1957, the Navy had cut an existing new construction
attack submarine, the USS Scorpion , in half and inserted a
130 foot missile section. In 1960, the USS George Washington
successfully launched two Polaris test missiles off Cape
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Canaveral, Florida. Almost exactly five years after the
creation of the SPO, the USS George Washington began its
first two month patrol as part of the US retaliatory force.
4. 1960-1965
The Polaris program's high point in the late 1950 's
passed clearly behind as the 1960 Presidential election faded
away. The missile gap which had become the major strategic
issue of the campaign turned out to be a myth. On 6 May 1962
at the Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific, the Polaris proved its
system reliability in the ultimate test ever performed in the
nuclear age by being the first US nuclear-armed ballistic
missile to be launched and detonated. Finally, the Polaris
began to receive the close scrutiny that it was excused from
during its heyday in the late 1950s.
C. NUCLEAR STRATEGY
1 . Deterrence
The relevant question this study seeks to answer
regarding the Polaris is this: what pushed its development?
Did national interest as expressed through military strategy
drive the Polaris? Or did the technological imperative? Or
did something more complex?
The concept of submarine launched ballistic missiles
arose out of several strategic considerations of the post
World War II era. First, deterrence was already a generally
accepted principle. Bernard Brodie wrote in 1946 in his
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seminal book The Absolute Weapon that the primary function of
military force in the nuclear age was to deter war; "it can
have almost no other useful purpose." (p. 76) Secretary of
Defense Forrestal reinforced the notion that deterrence was
accepted in government. In 1948 he noted that "the chief
deterrent to war, is the threat of immediate retaliation with
the atomic bomb." (Millis, 1959, p. 538)
Second, an obsession with surprise attack shaped the
overall strategy of deterrence. Brodie wrote as early as
1946 that nuclear weapons tilted the "scales overwhelmingly
in favor of surprise attack." (pp. 22-23) Wohlstetter 's
vulnerability studies quantified the problems of prevention
of surprise attack during the mid 1950s. Admiral Burke
testified before the Senate that Polaris would enhance the US
retaliatory posture because of its invulnerability (Senate,
1960, p. 292). Moreover, the NAVWAG-1 and Gaither Reports
were animated by a fear of surprise attack.
Lastly, Massive Retaliation was an asymmetrical
strategy that directly influenced the composition of US
military forces (Haley, 1985, p. 55). The national mindset
was opposed to any more land wars against Soviet or
Soviet-backed aggression, such as the Korean Conflict, hence
almost any form of nuclear weaponry received abundant
financial resources.
Deterrence, vulnerability, and massive retaliation
defined the strategic environment of the mid 1950s. However,
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two other points influenced strategic weapons procurement.
First, policy makers began to appreciate the subtleties of
counterforce and countervalue attacks. This created a need
to locate strategic forces away from population centers
(Armacost, 1969, p. 106). Second, problems with overseas
base rights began to appear (Senate, 1959, p. 75).
The Congress and the Department of Defense authorized
the Polaris Program because it satisfied all these
requirements. The Senate Armed Services Committee wrote that
the ballistic missiles had a single purpose: to deter by
threat of retaliation (Senate, 1959, p. 75). The Polaris
solved the problem of political control over bases by its sea
basing plan. Brodie wrote that it solved the vulnerability
issue by being both hardened (unlike SAC bombers) and
dispersed (1959, p. 218). Furthermore, a submarine's
inherent undetectability while submerged immediately rendered
it superior to a surface ship. The Polaris also solved the
problem of absorbing counterforce attacks.
Intelligence assessments of the threat played no
small role in Polaris development. But it was already
incorporated into the overall strategy outlined above. By
the time Sputnik ignited the nation's fears, the CNO's
requirement for a solid fueled submarine launched ballistic
missile was eight months old. The optimum Polaris missile
"envelope" and FBM submarine "envelope" were similarly
already established (SSPO, p. 25).
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The Killian Report integrated the Soviet threat and
technological opportunity. Although its original charter was
to analyze US vulnerability to a bolt-f rom-the-blue attack,
committee members also sought to redirect military research
toward development programs based on the threat. The Killian
report, while emphasizing national interest insofar as
recognizing the threat, did not formulate strategy. Killian
wrote later that the goal was not to pursue the capability
for mutual assured destruction, but rather to achieve and
remain at an offensive advantage (1977, pp. 74-75).
The fact that massive retaliation came under attack
during Polaris's crucial years in 1957-1959 does not upset
the premise that massive retaliation as a strategic concept
helped shape the requirement for it. The most eloquent
critique of the Dulles doctrine was that it recognized only
all-out war and all-out peace (Kissinger, 1957, p. 11). But
this hardly breaks the link between national interest,
military strategy, and Polaris.
2 . Targeting
In the field of nuclear strategy, one cannot consider
deterrence apart from targeting doctrine. The interaction
between Polaris and targeting, thus, needs to be explored.
During most of the 1950s, the Strategic Air Command's
targeting set included three major options:
Bravo: blunt the Soviet attack by destroying their nuclear
forces
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Romeo: retard movement of Soviet forces by attacking other
military targets in Eastern Europe
Delta: disarm Soviets by damaging their war industries.
(Rosenberg, p. 133)
Admiral Burke tried to develop alternate strategies in July
1958 with his proposal for "finite deterrence." Burke
believed Polaris could slow down the arms race by its low
political visibility and concluded that only a small Polaris
force was needed for deterrence. (Rosenberg, p. 164)
In November 1958, the National Security Council's Net
Evaluation Subcommittee began to shift toward this view; it
recommended that targeting emphasize urban-industrial targets
for cost efficiency reasons. Rosenberg wrote that Eisenhower
was sympathetic to this approach since he favored a minimum
force level approach to defense planning. Also, the Pres-
ident was displeased with SAC 's expanding target list and its
inevitable link to increasing force requirements, (p. 163)
Burke refined his finite deterrence in September
1959. He argued that it would be foolish to target empty
Soviet missile and bomber bases; instead, the US should
target cities and command centers. Eisenhower did not adopt
Burke's viewpoint and in 1960 stated the US would use SLBMs
for air defense suppression. (Rosenberg, p. 171)
During the same period, RAND analysts were arguing a
"no cities" targeting policy (Kaplan, 1983, p. 204). Robert
McNarnara adopted "no cities" targeting as an integral part of
his war-fighting and damage limitation strategy in his Ann
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Arbor speech (McNamara, 1962). McNamara changed this policy
once again in 1964-65; his new concept of Assured Destruction
was based on a systems analysis approach to allocating
resources and did not address the technological capabilities
or limitations of the US strategic force.
United States targeting policy had a seesaw existence
from 1957-1965. But the events do not suggest that Polaris
critically influenced targeting. Two forces appear to
explain the targeting shift during this period. First,
Rosenberg stated that the Navy and Army were trying to break
the "lucrative link" between the target list and expanding
SAC force requirements (p. 162). In short, it was becoming
financially infeasible to maintain a counterforce policy.
This dilemma turned up again when McNamara dropped a damage
limitation strategy in favor of assured destruction, in
response to economic forces. Second, political forces played
a huge role. The Kennedy Administration took office on a
platform criticizing massive retaliation. McNamara 's shift
to "no cities" reflected in part his idealistic desire to
show the Soviets good faith, in return for them not targeting
US cities.
A feedback loop probably exists in the strategy-
technology relationship. The Polaris technology provided the
impetus for creation of a Reserve Force. But the literature
does not provide evidence to support a common myth that
75
Polaris' inherent inaccuracy drove countervalue targeting,
the declaratory strategy of the 1965-1974 era.
It appears that the only role technology played was
as a vehicle to implement policy decisions. The US had
neglected ballistic missile technology in favor of manned
bombers until the Von Neumann Report. Therefore the US
reallocated resources into ballistic missile technology to
correct this deficiency and support the national policy.
Moreover, this situation supports Schmooker 's (cited in
Sapolsky, p. 236) contention that money determines the
direction of technology. Military labs (such as the Army's
Redstone Arsenal under Braun) performed most of the missile
research until the Von Neumann Report bred the Atlas program
Even then, contractors on the Polaris program took no
financial risk in the research and development (Sapolsky, p.
82).
D. CASE STUDY CONCLUSION
The Polaris program holds a very unique place in US
weapons development history. The project, along with its
sister ballistic missile programs, and the Manhattan Project
mobilized the technical resources of the nation toward a
common goal. The Polaris missile, especially, aquired a
mystique of its own: "It was not just another missile that
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was being built; it was, rather, the missile that was going
to stop the Russian threat to the US mainland." (Sapolsky, p.
159)
Admiral Raborn's vision carried over to the Polaris
contractors; eight of the largest published a sleek hardcover
book full of human interest stories and photographs of the
industry's Polaris efforts. Hughes Aircraft became so caught
up in the project's national importance that its female
workers wore red, white, and blue Polaris blouses
( Adventures ) . Additionally, a popular book, Polaris 1 , was
published at the height of the program (Barr, 1960).
Quite clearly, strategy, not technology, drove the
Polaris program. Sapolsky wrote the most forceful statement
than can be made regarding a possible technological
imperative; the Polaris benefitted from an "unusual
convergence between technological opportunities and a
consensus on national needs." (p. 241) Not all technically
advanced US weapons systems were likely to experience such a
unique convergence. Polaris 's follow-on missile, the MIRVed
Poseidon, suffered much political trauma in its development.
The next chapter will look at the possibility of a
technological imperative in the development of the Tomahawk.
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IV. THE TOMAHAWK: A CASE STUDY
"SLCM: A Weapon in Search of a Mission"
-Farrell, 1981, p. 105
"[SLCM]: A Weapon in Search of a Mission"
-Huisken, 1981, p. 28
A. INTRODUCTION
The two quotations above suggest that the Tomahawk cruise
missile is ripe for evaluation as a test of technological
imperative hypotheses. The authors suggest that the Tomahawk
program evolved without a clear-cut mission. On the surface,
this suggestion appears to justify the claims that strategic
weapons systems emerge from the "military-industrial complex"
without well-founded strategic rationales. This case study
reaches the opposite conclusion -- that the US strategic
cruise missile (SCM) program developed from sound strategic
considerations and ultimately produced a worthwhile strategic
weapon: the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) . That the
Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) remains without
an apparent role is not an egregious example of technology
run rampant, but rather of glacial doctrinal adaptation.
None of the three reasons that endorsed the Polaris as a
useful case study apply in the Tomahawk situation. Unlike
Polaris, the Tomahawk SLCM is not strictly a strategic
weapon. It presently has three variants: nuclear land
attack (TLAM/N), conventional land attack (TLAM/C), and
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anti-ship missile (TASM). Second, the Tomahawk development
chronology is not narrow in scope; it begins in 1972 as a
strategic cruise missile, proceeds to a 1977 split into the
strategic ALCM and theater SLCM, and continues today with its
third version, the GLCM. Third, it did not command as high a
level of technical resources as the Polaris. Indeed, one of
the SLCM's primary attributes is its cost-effectiveness.
B. CHRONOLOGY
1. 1946-1962
While the modern history of cruise missiles began
with the same German rocket scientists of the ballistic
missile program, it would be incomplete without mention of
Elmer A. Sperry, cofounder of Sperry Gyroscope Company. The
principles of gyros permitted unmanned flight. In September
1916, a US Navy Lieutenant witnessed and reported a test
flight of an unmanned aircraft; however, the military had no
immediate interest. (Werrell, p. 7)
The military potential of unmanned aircraft became
apparent with the V-l during World War II. Similarly, the
desperate Japanese kamikaze attacks showed the usefulness of
guided bombs. US Navy experience with the V-l led to the
Regulus I strategic cruise missile. The Regulus I carried a
3.8 megaton warhead 250 miles and operated from 1955-1964.
During its day, the Navy considered it a moderately
successful strategic missile and even constructed a nuclear
powered guided missile submarine, USS Halibut (SSGN-587), to
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launch it. Several diesel submarines specifically designed
for Regulus I were also commissioned.
The Navy's success with the subsonic Regulus I led to
development of a supersonic Regulus II. At the same time,
the Director of the CNO's Long Range Objectives Group
attempted to fill a forecasted shortcoming in retaliatory
capability in the 1961-1963 period. While emphasizing the
obvious solution of increasing the rate of Polaris SSBN
production, he advanced the idea of developing a 1200 mile
unmanned, all-weather cruise missile. He believed that a
modified Regulus II could attain a 2000 mile range with
accuracy sufficient for the existing urban targeting policy.
(DON, 1958) Ultimately, high cost and greater promise of
Polaris forced cancellation of Regulus II in late 1958.
The Air Force also worked with cruise missiles in the
1950s. In addition to its well-known ballistic
recommendations, the Von Neumann Strategic Missiles
Evaluation Committee reported in 1954 that the Air Force
Snark and Navaho missiles had serious deficiencies (Werrell,
p. 93). The Snark relied on a complex celestial navigation
system that the Committee objected to. It recommended, inter
alia , that the Air Force use cruise missiles in a decoy mode
to assist long range bombers in penetrating Soviet air
defenses. The Air Force ballistic missile program also




The October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis introduced the
US Navy to a relatively new threat: short range, surface-
to-surface missiles fired from patrol boats. The Soviets had
outfitted the Cuban Navy with 25 mile SS-N-2 Styx missiles
aboard Osa class gunboats. By this time the Navy had gained
considerable experience in surface-to-air missiles, but
relied on carrier aircraft for battlegroup protection against
tactical surface-to-surface cruise missiles.
The lack of a tactical anti-ship cruise missile was a
manageable problem since the Navy possessed overwhelming
carrier airpower in the mid-1962. Nevertheless, Captain
(later Admiral) Worth Bagley, and Captain (later Admiral)
Elmo Zumwalt, proposed to Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze a
major research and development program in 1966 for anti-ship
cruise missiles. Nitze's approval laid the foundation for
official Navy support of long range cruise missiles. (Art and
Ockenden, 1981, p. 381)
The 1967 Arab-Israeli war provided the most important
impetus to the fledgling US Navy cruise missile program. The
Egyptian sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat with a SS-N-2
shifted the US effort from one of study to one of action.
Indeed the incident "jolted" the West ("Navy," 1972, p. 60).
In 1968 the Navy set up the Anti-ship Missile Defense Office.
This led to a Defense Select Acquisition Review Council
(DSARC) decision in November 1970 to approve
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development of the Harpoon, a 60 mile anti-ship tactical
missile (Huisken, p. 29). Since the Harpoon would not become
available until the mid-1970s, the Navy also began the
Interim Surface-to-Surface Missile (ISSM) as an interim
measure (Jane's, 1972, p. 46).
The years 1970-71 marked several milestones in the
development of cruise missiles. First, Elmo Zumwalt became
CNO and immediately began pushing for a long range cruise
missile. Zumwalt 's memoirs illustrated his intense feelings:
"To my mind the Navy's dropping in the 1950s of a promising
program for a cruise missile called 'Regulus' was the
single worst decision about weapons made during my years of
service." (Zumwalt, 1976, p. 81)
Second, the Center for Naval Analyses issued a study
that evaluated the contribution such a missile would make to
strategic forces. It concluded that an underwater launched
cruise missile was feasible. (Werrell, p. 151) Third, the
Harpoon Project Office set up a separate program element
called "Cruise Missiles (Advanced)" (ACM) to "consider the
follow-on technological cruise missile developments beyond
Harpoon." (Canfield and Kellett, p. 39) Lastly, the CNO
established the Submarine-Launched Anti-Ship Interim Missile
Ad Hoc Panel to develop Harpoon as a rapid way to achieve a
long range SLCM capability (Levine, 1977, p. 127).
This period also witnessed the confluence of several
other trends. United States forces in Vietnam achieved
outstanding success with Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV)
.
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The Ryan Firebee RPV had an especially low loss rate, even
when employed in heavily defended areas. Additionally, the
Air Force desired a new decoy to replace the Quail of the
1960s. The Congress, however, favored a dual mission for any
new decoy, that of decoy and long range attack missile.
Subsequently the Air Force began the Subsonic Cruise Armed
Decoy (SCAD) program. Crucial to this program was the
development of an efficient turbofan engine for long range.
In April 1971, the Navy proposed a new class of
guided missile nuclear submarines to carry a proposed 300-500
mile cruise missile. The project earned the acronym STAWS
for Submarine Tactical Antiship Weapons System and gained
considerable support from Admiral Rickover. Therefore, at
the time of the May 1972 SALT agreements, the Navy possessed
two cruise missile programs: the Harpoon tactical anti-ship
missile and the ACM long range anti-ship missile. At that
time, the SCM was only an element within conceptual studies
overseen by the Secretary of Defense's Systems and Analysis
Section. (Werrell, p. 151)
Secretary of Defense Laird and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff were not as sanguine about the SALT I Interim
Agreement and the ABM Agreement as the rest of the country.
They conditioned their support of the agreements on a series
of assurances. Among these was an increase in spending for
modernizing strategic forces. (DOD, 1973, p. 22) Laird
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immediately appeared before Congress to ask for additional
funding to the Fiscal Year 1973 Military Procurement
Authorization
.
Laird proposed additional funding for the Trident
system, B-l bomber, and the submarine launched cruise missile
(Senate, 1972, p. 4194). Since the strategic SLCM had been
essentially a conceptual study, these hearings represented
its first major airing before the Congress. Specifically,
the Secretary of Defense requested funding to give the first
ten Polaris SSBNs an SCM capability. This deployment mode
seemed logical since the SALT Interim Agreement had limited
SSBNs and would have forced decommissioning of older Polaris
SSBNs as the new Trident SSBNs began sea trials.
With Laird's backing and the enthusiastic support of
the Defense Director of Research and Engineering, John
Foster, the SCM progressed smartly. In November 1972 the
Navy cancelled the ACM and STAWS programs in favor of a SLCM
with both tactical and strategic variants. Laird's vision
had focused on a strategic SLCM based on a Center for Naval
Analyses study; the Navy's only active long range SLCM
program was a tactical anti-ship version (ACM) managed
through the Harpoon Project Office. The new SLCM program was
directed to use existing technology, such as the SCAD
turbofan engine. (Werrell, p. 153)
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3. 1972-1977
Congress received its first official presentation on
the post-SALT SLCM program during the Fiscal Year 1974
Military Procurement Authorization hearings in spring 1973.
Captain (later Rear Admiral) Walter Locke, USN, the SLCM
Program Manager, stated that his objective was:
"to develop a submarine launched very long range, low
altitude, relatively invulnerable, cruise missile resulting
in a credible deterrent and a more diversified mix of
United States Strategic Forces." (Senate, 1973, p. 2630)
He argued that the US lagged behind the Soviets in deployment
of cruise missiles and buttressed his contention with a slide
showing SS-N-3 Shaddock coverage of the East Coast as far
inland as Pittsburgh and Atlanta.
Locke presented four launch options at these
hearings
:
1. vertical launch out of converted SSBNs, such as the
oldest 10 of the Polaris/Poseidon series;
2. horizontal launch from standard, 21 inch, SSN
torpedo tubes;
3. horizontal launch from standard, 21 inch, SSBN
torpedo tubes;
4. vertical launch from a new design SSN (derived from
the STAWS concept). (Senate, 1973, p. 2635)
Option one represented the original Laird proposal. Admiral
Zumwalt favored option two and Admiral Rickover favored
option four, since it involved a new submarine design. As
part of the acquisition process, the DSARC would choose one
of the four options.
In June 1973, Malcolm R. Currie testified before the
Senate Armed Services Committee on the occasion of his
85
nomination to replace John Foster, who had retired. While
Currie supported the SCM like his predecessor, he stated it
should not be associated just with submarines. In his eyes
the ultimate goal was to produce a strategic cruise missile
"with the question of specific roles and launch platforms --
land, sea, or air -- left open until the technology is
demonstrated." (Senate, 1973a, p. 14)
In June and July 1973, Henry Kissinger twice wrote to
Deputy Secretary of Defense ( DSOD ) William P. Clements, Jr.
on the usefulness of the SCM for negotiating leverage in the
continuing SALT negotiations. At the same time, Clements
cancelled the SCAD program for cost-effectiveness reasons and
started up the ALCM program. The DSOD directed that the Navy
and Air Force cooperate in developing technology.
Specifically, the Air Force would share its efficient
turbofan engine from the SCAD program and the Navy would
contribute its terrain contour matching (TERCOM) guidance.
(Werrell, p. 154) This method of guidance compared a radar
altimeter picture of the terrain with a map stored on an
onboard computer.
The period 1973 to 1977 represented the period of
greatest cooperation between the two programs. During this
period the strategic cruise missile matured within the Navy.
Its acronym, SLCM, shifted from meaning submarine -launched to
sea-launched cruise missile, in order to accomodate surface
ships. Also in 1975, the Navy bestowed the name
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Tomahawk on the SLCM. The Air Force did not assign a name to
its ALCM program.
In November 1974, the final operational requirements
were released; these requirements called for a torpedo
tube-sized missile with strategic and tactical variants.
Three months later, Currie proposed a new rationale for the
SLCM. He argued that a SLCM's slow flight time made it
useful for an unambiguous response in a crisis situation,
compared to a ballistic missile which could spook an
adversary. Also SLCMs could serve as part of the
invulnerable reserve force. (Huisken, p. 42)
However, the Navy began to emphasize that it held a
requirement for a conventional SLCM (TLAM/C) for power
projection roles. The SLCM land attack mission underwent a
shift from strategic nuclear to theater nuclear and
conventional. (Huisken, p. 45-48) Ultimately, of course, the
strategic cruise missile role went to the ALCM.
4. 1977-1987
The January 1977 DSARC meeting marked one of the most
significant milestones in the cruise missile chronology.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements' decision memorandum
from this meeting produced several recommendations. (Werrell,
p. 171) First, it proposed shifting both the SLCM and ALCM
program into full scale engineering development. This step
represented a significant increase in commitment due to the
requirement for large increases in funding (DOD, 1968, p.
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149). Second, DSARC recommended the establishment of a joint
development office, with the Navy as lead manager. This
became the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office (JCMPO) under
Rear Admiral Locke. Third, the new JCMPO was directed to
concentrate on a long range, 1500 mile ALCM. The previous
design contained the original SCAD constraints. Fourth,
DSARC gave greater priority to the TLAM/N version, relative
to the TLAM/C and TASM. Lastly, DSARC also moved TASM into
full scale engineering development. Overall, Clements desired
a program that had little performance risk and maximum
sharing of components between the two systems (Concrow, et
al, 1982, p. 6).
President Carter confirmed the Air Force's greatest
fears by cancelling the B-l bomber and extending B-52 life
with ALCMs on 30 June 1977 (Werrell, p. 177). This action
reinforced the ALCM as the nation's strategic cruise missile
and further shifted the TLAM/N to a lesser role. Also the
Carter Administration postponed the TLAM/N development scheme
aboard SSNs (Sorrels, p. 2). This led the Government
Accounting Office to observe that "OSD seems reluctant to
produce and deploy the nuclear land attack SLCM." (GAO, 1980,
p. 67)
The late 1970s marked a period of considerable GAO
interest in the SLCM. On 26 January 1977 it released a
critical report titled, "Confusion and Uncertainty as to the
Need for and Use of Air Launched and Tomahawk Cruise Missile
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Programs." (GAO, 1977) This report recommended that the
Secretary of Defense relate the requirement to mission needs,
"in particular the Navy requirements for nuclear cruise
missiles...." (GAO, 1977a) In 1978 a skeptical GAO reported
that the future of the cruise missile "will be determined
more by the outcome of the SALT discussion than by military
need." (GAO, 1978, p. 76)
The Reagan Administration reversed the B-l decision
and continued the SLCM program. Today, the first squadron of
ALCM equipped B-l bombers exists. The first SSN equipped
with a vertical launch capability, USS CHICAGO (SSN-721), was
commissioned in 1986. The TLAM/N still remains as a theater
weapon with a vague role. The TLAM/C has received attention
for its possible use in the Persian Gulf ("New Duties," 1987,
p. 7C).
C. DEVELOPMENT RATIONALES
1 . Nuclear strategy
As with Polaris, this case study seeks to answer the
question: "What drove the Tomahawk procurement decision --
innovative technology or national strategy?" The previous
section reviewed the important events of Tomahawk
development, particularly during the crucial 1972-1977 time
frame. This section will begin with nuclear strategy from
1965, when it left off in the Polaris case study, and
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continue to the beginning of the Carter Administration. The
strategy will then be related to the procurement decision.
McNamara devoted much time to seeking an answer to
one of the perplexing dilemmas of the nuclear era: how much
is enough? He discovered that his early damage limitation
advocacy resulted in more requests for nuclear forces in
order to manage an expanding Soviet target list. He then
applied a systems analysis approach to this question. He
determined that on a graph of effectiveness versus equivalent
megatonnage (EMT), the curve became flatter at 400 EMT. This
later translated into destruction of 30 percent of the
population and 76 percent of industry (Enthoven and Smith,
1971, p. 207). He turned this concept of force sizing into
an approach to nuclear strategy called Assured Destruction
(AD) .
Under the prevailing sentiment of the time, AD
evolved into mutual assured destruction (MAD). McNamara
believed that AD was a fundamental truth in the nuclear age,
equally apparent to both the US and USSR. Hence, each power
was to maintain only that amount of strategic force necessary
to obtain the assured destruction of the other. Any notion
of strategic superiority was explicitly denied. It must be
noted, however, that the Soviets never accepted the mutuality
of assured destruction. While eschewing superiority,
McNamara did not object to modernization; his Fiscal Year
1969-73 defense program included funds for "advanced ICBM
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technology." (DOD, 1968, p. 71) Also the Poseidon and
Minuteman III MIRV programs began during his tenure.
With its rejection of superiority and satisfaction
with the existing nuclear relationship, the AD strategy would
not have provided the impetus for strategic cruise missile
development. From the standpoint of "Assured destruction,"
competing for advantages in the nuclear arms race was
hopeless. The 400 EMT force size was to be divided among a
triad with only periodic modernization. Betts wrote that the
strategic cruise missile was neutral with respect to AD.
That is to say, the SCM had no effect on AD and AD provided
no rationale for the SCM's procurement. (Betts, p. 11)
The Nixon Administration held a different set of core
beliefs regarding nuclear strategy and the US-USSR
relationship. Two elements of its national security strategy
played a role in cruise missile development: advancement of
the strategy of "sufficiency" and a commitment to arms
control negotiations. That arms control could have such an
irrevocable link with strategic force procurement was
illustrated by Nixon:
"Putting an end to the arms race meant working out
tradeoffs with the Soviets, and I wanted us to have the
most bargaining chips from the outset in order to get
the best deal." (Nixon, 1978, p. 414)
Two important elements distinguished Nixon's policy
of strategic sufficiency from the strategies of previous
administrations. (DOD, 1971, p. 15) First, strategic force
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procurement decisions would be "based on specific criteria,"
instead of the arbitrary 40C EMT yardstick. Second, the
strategy contained "a reemphasis on maintaining and using our
technological superiority." Most importantly, strategic
sufficiency represented a shift away from AD; it called for
adequate "war-fighting capability .. .both in limited nuclear
and conventional options." (DOD, 1971, p. 17)
Strategic sufficiency had direct implications in
strategic force planning -- both in force levels and force
composition. Speciiically , the strategy had four objectives:
1. adequate US second strike capability;
2. no first strike incentive for the USSR in a crisis;
3. equal destructive capability between the US and USSR;
4. modest damage limitation capability for the US, with
the Safeguard ABM system. (DOD, 1972, p. 65)
Laird emphasized that US force planning required flexibility
so that alternatives were available to the President,
depending on the level of aggression. Furthermore diversity
was a key item:
"We are examining new concepts for future strategic
offensive forces, keyed to an approach that diversifies
U.S. programs if additional capabilities are needed in
the future." (DOD, 1972, p. 67)
Implicit in strategic sufficiency was a recognition
of the huge Soviet buildup of strategic weapono. Members of
the US Blue Ribbon Defense Panel reported in 1970 that the
US-USSR balance was undergoing a radical shift. By
highlighting the growing Soviet first-strike capability, the
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report provided one of the first indications that the Soviets
did not adhere to the MAD concept. Additionally, the Pane]
warned of a threat to US technical superiority which could
produce a "disastrous technical surprise." (Blue Ribbon
Panel, 1970, p. x) The Nixon Administration supported this
warning, as illustrated in Laird's 1972 Annual Report:
"The continued Soviet strategic offensive force buildup,
with its long term implications, convinced us that we need
to undertake a major new strategic initiative." (DOD,
1972, p. 69)
Also the Nixon Administration entered office with a
commitment to strategic arms control. The SALT agreements
were seen as a way to obtain stability in nuclear
competition. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had a vision
of a new relationship between the US and USSR. Kissinger
wrote that "...we also needed SALT if we were ever to explore
the possibilities of peaceful coexistence." (Kissinger, 1979,
p. 1245)
The SALT I Interim Agreement froze the strategic
delivery vehicles and launchers of the US and USSR, but at a
lower level for the US. Additionally, it allowed the Soviet
Union heavy ICBMS but prohibited the US from producing any,
even though the US had none. This seeming imbalance (and
others) were considered warranted by US technical superiority
and possession of strategic bombers; it was justified under
the name "offsetting asymmetries."
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The SALT I agreements served to codify nuclear parity
between the US and USSR. As such, these agreements
illustrated the dominant strategic nuclear trend of the early
1970s; the Soviets had quickly caught up with the US from
the depths of the Cuban missile crisis and were on the verge
of shifting the nuclear balance against the US. The U.S.
Blue Ribbon Panel and the Secretary of Defense certainly
recognized this trend. Kissinger was in the unlikely
position of championing a strategic arms agreement while
endorsing a US strategic buildup: "We needed the agreement
if we wanted to catch up in offensive weapons." (emphasis
added) (Kissinger, 1979, p. 1245)
The evidence suggests that the twin strategies of
strategic sufficiency and arms control provided the rationale
for developing the Tomahawk. Recognition of the
deteriorating strategic trend vis a vis the Soviets, emphasis
on technical superiority, and rejection of McNamara's AD in
favor of the more flexible strategic sufficiency occurred
before Laird chose to initiate Tomahawk development.
Strategic sufficiency encouraged the development of strategic
weapons with the attributes of diversity and technological
superiority. The SLCM in its original role fulfilled this
need.
In Laird's view, the SALT I agreements were achieved
only because the US had successfully pursued Safeguard,
Poseidon, and Minuteman III (Senate, 1972, p. 4194).
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Therefore, US nuclear forces had to be bolstered for the next
round of SALT negotiations, with increased funding for
Trident, B-l, and the SLCM. Laird's testimony was explicit
in this matter; the US needed "hedges for the future.... This
is no time for complacency." (Senate, 1972, p. 4195)
Laird provided several other specific rationales for
the cruise missile. First, the SLCM would provide a
comparable capability to the nuclear-capable, 250 mile
SS-N-3, deployed aboard Soviet guided missile submarines.
Second, the submarine basing mode would add significant
survivability to US retaliatory forces. Third, the cruise
missile's low flying characteristics would stress Soviet air
defenses. (Senate, 1972, p. 4244) Moreover, Laird had to
actively solicit inputs from the Joint Chiefs for a
modernization plan; his own in-house technical group, the
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), did not
manage the early SCM projects, SCAD and ACM. The fact that
the Navy's interest lay more in the long range Harpoon
anti-ship missile successor (ACM) lends weight to the
judgement that no existing " techno-bureaucracy" pushed the
strategic cruise missile.
The shifts in declaratory targeting philosophy and
policy during the Nixon Administration appear to have played
no role in the SCM development decisions. While the MAD
concept underwent a significant assault during the early
1970s, it was not until 1974 that a significant change in
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targeting policy was openly promulgated. Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger announced that the US would shift
to a menu of selective options instead of massive nuclear
strikes (Schlesinger, 1974).
Even without directly targeting cities, the previous
options, invciving extensive collateral damage to cities and
industry, could have given the Soviets the wrong signal and
invited retaliatory strikes on US cities. The new strategy
would give the President more flexibility. However,
Schlesinger was more concerned with ±ChM accuracy and
retargetability; Huisken reported that Schlesinger was
neutral toward the SCM (Huisken, p. 40). Malcolm Currie
appeared to have tried to fit the SLCM into the Schlesinger
strategy, but as the chronology showed, achieved no success
(Huisken, p. 43 )
.
2. Technological Issues
This analysis would be incomplete without examining
the problem in reverse and addressing technological issues.
The SCM represents for many a classic example of
technological imperative. Of the four major cruise missile
studies, three — Betts, Sorrel, and Werrell -- concluded
technological determinism played a role. Huisken, however,
devoted an entire chapter to "Technological Momentum" and
concluded none existed.
One of the issues concerned whether the SCM was a
first or second generation weapon. Nihart (1972) and
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Pfaltzgraff and Davis (1977) evaluated it as a second
generation weapon. Tinajero (1976), Tsipis (1975), and Thee
(1986) argued the cruise missile was a revolutionary
breakthrough. Tsipis and Werrell were particularly impressed
by electronic miniaturization and guidance improvements.
Werrell 's chronology of systems development seems no
contradict his own conclusion. He conceded that the TERCOM
guidance system was patented in 1958 by E Systems. Fourteen
years passed, however, until TERCOM received the necessary
strategic attention. The Navy did not devote funds to it
until Laird pushed the SCM, since the Harpoon and its long
range anti-ship successor did not use it. After the 1972 SCM
decision, three years of development, sparked by Laird's
strategic rationale, were followed before the Navy conducted
a TERCOM competitive flyoff between E Systems and McDonnell
Douglas. (Werrell. p. 155) Ironically, McDonnell Douglas
used many off-the-shelf components in its design and beat E
Systems, TERCOM's original developer, for the SCM contract.
The computer to store the maps of predetermined target areas
was one of the few new components. (Robinson, 1973, p. 13)
Huisken provided the most incisive analysis of why
the fuel efficient turbofan engine did not reflect a
revolutionary breakthrough (p. 166). Aircraft designers of
the 1950s searched for more powerful turbo jet engines for
supersonic flight. This preoccupation precluded them from
extensive research into fuel efficient turbo fan engines.
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Levine (1977) added that the turbofan engine was developed
around the late 1950s and received major improvements in the
mid-1960s (p. 124). Evidently, the turbofan required a
pressing military need before it gained extensive engineering
development
.
Probably the most accurate characterization of cruise
missile technology development would be to say that it grew
out of inchoate programs. Betts wrote that cruise missile
technology grew out of "uncoordinated evolution of
technological innovation rather than a deliberate effort or
an epochal breakthrough." (p. 4) Nevertheless, this sort of
evolutionary development does not support the technological
imperative argument. After all, the TERCOM and turbofan
technologies were not conceptually matched until 1973 --
after Laird's post-SALT request (Levine, p. 140). Until that
time, the turbofan SCAD was just a long range decoy and the
SLCM was just a long-range version of the turbojet Harpoon
equipped with terrain guidance of existing technology.
D. CASE STUDY CONCLUSION
The case study has demonstrated that strategic rationales
decisively influenced the development of the strategic cruise
missile. The Nixon Administration attempted to redress a
worsening strategic balance and lay the groundwork for a
strong position in future SALT negotiations. Kissinger
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(1982) wrote later, "We never believed detente would ease our
defense burden." (p. 998)
While prevalent in the literature, the technological
imperative hypothesis have been shown to be false. The issue
is ultimately one of evolutionary versus revolutionary
development. Clearly, the CNO would never offer the
Secretary of Defense an infeasible idea for a weapons system.
Nevertheless, the two most important cruise missile
technologies, guidance and propulsion, existed before 1972.
Only a strategic push was needed to develop them. Sapolsky's
statement in the Polaris case study that a convergence of
technological opportunity and strategic need existed seems
also to apply for the SCM (Sapolsky, 1972, p. 241).
The case study primarily addressed the origins of the
Tomahawk and, therefore, ignored current doctrinal issues.
As the quotes at the beginning of the case study indicate,
the SLCM still has no official designated missions ten years
after its introduction. But the chronology indicates that
the Navy has had a long interest in an anti-ship cruise
missile (TASM) and a recent interest in a conventional land
attack cruise missile (TLAM/C). The latter two versions have
been integrated into the Navy's force structure and doctrine.
More precisely, the current criticism should be leveled
at the TLAM/N. It presently has no official strategic role,
at least not in the public domain. Its stated theater
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role is murky, since the control of attack submarines
presents difficult command problems between the National
Command Authority and the Unified CINCs. Unlike Air Force
GLCMs and Army Pershings, Navy TLAM/N equipped SSNs
constantly change position and have additional crucial
missions, such as ASW or aircraft carrier protection. But
this is a doctrinal problem, not a strategic problem, since
the fundamental purpose of a strategic cruise missile is to
support US national strategy, as exemplified by the ALCM.
One cannot blame the TLAM/N 's current travails on
technological imperative hypotheses.
Secretary of Defense Laird's original strategic cruise
missile proposal underwent several changes. The original
SSBN proposal was dropped because the weapon conversion and
reactor plant overhaul and refueling would not have been cost
effective. The succeeding SSN option did not survive as a
launch platform vis a vis the Air Force B-l and B-52 for two
reasons. (Huisken, p. 128) First, only bombers could deploy
cruise missiles in large enough quantities. The Air Force
has equipped 98 B-52Gs with up to 20 ALCMs apiece (DOD, 1987,
p. 209). This quantity is much higher than 90 first line
SSNs each carrying, at most, two to four TLAM/Ns , clue the
necessity to stock an SSN's torpedo room with torpedoes for
self-defense and ASW. Second, the strategic mission could
not be reconciled with the SSN's ASW mission. An SSN's ASW
role may require it to operate in an area which is
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not suitable for a TLAM/N launch; also command and control
problems are complex.
The Tomahawk showed the complex relationship between
national strategy and technology. The case study also
illustrated a weapons procurement determinant not found in
the Polaris study: arms control. While the case study
vindicated defenders of the rational school of strategic
weapons procurement, it portrayed a process far more complex
than the interests-strategy-weapons model.
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V. DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE STRATEGY?
"Americans pride themselves on their skill in organizing
yet this skill has yet to be applied to security, which is
the foremcst business of any nation."
-Possony and Pournelle, 1970, p. 91
A. ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES
James Kurth (1971) wrote that a "thicket of theories" has
developed to explain rationales for US weapons purchases (p.
373). Among these are the strategic rationale, the
technological rationale, and the bureaucratic rationale (the
latter was not evaluated in this study). The two case
studies have shown that the strategic rationale applied for
the Polaris and Tomahawk development and acquisition process.
While this conclusion vindicates the national level
policymakers, what can be said for the other strategic
planning decision-models? In other words, can critics charge
that the military services are producing weapons before they
have a need for them?
Figure 4 depicted where the US Navy fits into the weapons
capability decision process. Prior to Polaris, Navy strategy
certainly did not call for an intercontinental ballistic
missile. Two Presidential Commissions, the Von Neumann and
the Killian, provided the genesis for a Navy ballistic
missile capability, not an internal Navy-generated mission
need. Similarly, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
originated the need for the Tomahawk SLCM.
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In an earlier era, critics turned the technological
imperative critique on its head. Strategists charged that
the Army was slow to integrate the "new" tank into its
doctrine. The Navy was slow to see the value of "new"
aircraft carriers; its 7 December 1941 fleet was weighted
heavily toward obsolete battleships. In these cases military
services had a mission, but had not integrated weapons based
on the new technology into it.
In effect, critics of US weapons procurement tend to play
both ends against the middle. If the services are slow to
fit an existing weapon into a newly emerging need, such as
the tank, they receive criticism. If they are quick to
integrate a newly emerging weapon into an existing need, such
as the SLCM, they again receive criticism. In the latter
case, critics write that a technological imperative exists
and that technology is driving strategy.
The way to ease this dilemma is for the defense studies
community to standardize its terminology. A previous section
asserted the need to differentiate between national security
interest and national interest. The present discussion
indicates that strategy and doctrine need to be clarified.
Unlike the Soviet Union, the US has imprecise meanings for
these terms ( Evangelista, 1984, p. 601). This paper has
demonstrated that military strategy belongs in the realm of
national level leadership (except probably in time of war).
Doctrine, however, is task- or service-specific. The Navy,
103
for example, has ASW doctrine, the Marine Corps has
amphibious doctrine, the Army/Air Force team has AirLand
Battle doctrine. As Holley (1986) stated, doctrine is a
"mode of approach" based on experience for accomplishing
missions
.
Therefore students of national security affairs should
not levy a general criticism that services are not ready to
fully integrate new weapons into their operational plans and
doctrines. In the case of the Tomahawk SLCM, the Navy should
not be criticized for still working out a doctrine for it.
As VADM Metcalf (1987) stated, the job of the current
generation of naval officers is to determine the most
effective manner of employing forces provided to them by the
senior generation. That is to say, experience is necessary
to fully integrate a new weapon.
This discussion points to some necessary modifications to
Figures 4 and 5. Clearly, military strategy may influence
capabilities before a service doctrine is developed for it.
Also a feedback loop must exist between new capabilities and
service doctrine . However, the case studies have shown that
new capabilities, i.e. new technologies, the focus of this
paper, have not influenced military strategy. Therefore, a
feedback loop from capabilities back up to
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military strategy (or national interest) is not required or
desired. Figure 4 is thus resubmitted as Figure 8
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Fig. 8 Modified Service-based
Decision-making Model
B. CONCLUSION
This study began by showing that national security
affairs are rooted in a process called strategic planning. A
three element sequence of interest-strategy-capabilities was
identified as the core of the process. Various models for
strategic planning decisionmaking indicated that interests
are the necessary first step.
"Interests" are a shorthand notation for national
security interests or national interests. Scholarship
regarding "national interest" in the field of international
relations is largely dormant. Strategic studies scholars
have noted that military strategy is broadening into national
and grand strategy, which includes assessments of the
national interest.
The vagueness of the national interest concept allowed it
to fall into the morass of "ends and means." It was shown
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that humanities, such as metaphysics, provided the basic
means for determining national interests. Social sciences,
such as international relations, military science, and
business administration provided the ends. John Locke's
natural rights philosophy and St. Thomas Aquinas' Just War
criteria were cited in Chapter II as political and
theological theories that established the enduring values for
the US national interest.
A new paradigm for the national interest based on the
Constitution was established in Figure 7. The paradigm
divided national interest into political and moral
components, and assigned the term "national interest" to the
political element. Since self-preservation is a moral
obligation of states, the term "national security interests"
was assigned to the moral component; the Declaration of
Independence, the Constitution, and Lincoln's Gettysburg
Address provided its foundation.
The new model for national interest found certitude, but
also a messy political process, in the Constitution. In the
recum of national security planning, democracies are clearly
inferior to dictatorships because the latter have the
advantages of secrecy, coercion, and a minimum of debate
before action ( DeTocqueville, p. 234). Yet the Constitution
provides a mechanism for determining the national interest
that is satisfactory for US strategic planners and provides
democratic legitimacy for the policies.
106
This second part of this study showed that the
technological imperative hypothesis detracts from the ideal
strategic planning process. This argument suggests that the
advancement of weapons technology represents an immutable
process that man is helpless to stop. Therefore, glamorous
new technologies compel government policymakers to buy new
weapons, regardless of whether the stated military strategy
requires it.
The Polaris SLBM and Tomahawk SLCM systems were selected
in order to determine if the technological imperative
influenced their development. It was found for Polaris that
the US military strategy of deterrence through massive
retaliation, in concert with the threat posed by Soviet
missile advances, led directly to the initial Polaris
procurement decision. Only then did government policymakers
allocate resources to develop the necessary propulsion,
guidance, and warhead technologies. This sequence fit the
ideal standard in traditional strategic planning: interest-
strategy-capabilities. The technological imperative played
no role.
The Nixon Administration replacement of Assured
Destruction strategy with Strategic Sufficiency, combined
with its inclination toward arms control, led directly to the
initial Tomahawk procurement decision. The Tomahawk case was
complicated by the fact that the eventual strategic weapon
was an ALCM, rather than the original SLCM. The Navy is now
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attempting to fit the SLCM into its doctrine and is receiving
unjustified criticism for having to do so.
Each case study disproved the technological imperative
hypothesis. It appeared that technological opportunity and
strategic need converged in each case. Furthermore, the
national interest, as defined in this paper, supported the
strategies which influenced the two weapons purchases. The
national interest paradigm of Figure 7 allowed elected
officials to change the direction of national policy, as when
the Nixon Administration shifted nuclear strategy from that
articulated during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.
The case studies also shed new light on the interaction
between strategy and technology. From a larger standpoint,
the national interest paradigm and technological imperative
hypothesis illustrated the components and linkages of the
strategic planning process. As a policy-relevant study
(Gray, 1982, p. 2), it will hopefully raise questions for
those charged with procurement of strategic weapons.
Additionally, since this paper chose a route between a macro
and micro approach, it is hoped that it may contribute to
middle range theory on defense procurement and open areas for
further research, such as the relationship of the public
interest to national security interests and national
interests. An investigation of how or if a given weapon
system supports military strategy over its design lifetime,
rather than just in the initial procurement phase, would also
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prove valuable. Developing a more rigorous model of
strategy, doctrine, and tactics, similar to Soviet efforts,
would prove challenging but very beneficial to the field of
strategic planning.
The quote at the beginning of this chapter suggests that
Americans do not practice efficient planning in national
security. Although planning has never been the strong suit
of a democracy, even a marginal planning capability still
tends to receive strident criticism. This is unfortunate,
for as political commentator Charley Reese said: "...people
fall out of love with life ... [because] they demand
perfection and that isn't in the contract." (1981, p. 161)
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